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Abstract 
We test one of the main predictions of the financial flexibility paradigm, that expectations about future 
firm-specific investment shocks affect the firm’s leverage.  We extract the expectations of small and 
large future shocks from the market prices of equity options.  We find that leverage decreases in 
anticipation of an increase in both types of future shocks and the relation is statistically significant 
even when we control for standard determinants of leverage and the firm’s probability of default.  
Expectations for future shocks explain more variation of the leverage than standard determinants of 
leverage do and they affect more the small and financially constrained firms.  Our results are not 
subject to an endogeneity bias and they confirm De Angelo et al. (2011) model’s predictions and the 
evidence that managers seek for financial flexibility.  
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1. Introduction  
There is indirect evidence and theoretical support in the context of the financial flexibility paradigm 
that expectations of a firm’s manager about future changes in the firm’s investment opportunity set 
play a key role in determining the firm's capital structure.  Financial flexibility is defined as the firm’s 
ability to take advantage of (cope with) a positive (negative) shock in its investment opportunity set.  
Survey studies by Graham and Harvey (2001), Bancel and Mitoo (2004) and Brounen et al. (2006) 
document that U.S. and European Chief Financial Officers set the firm's financing policy so as to 
primarily maintain the firm’s financial flexibility.  DeAngelo et al. (2011) derive theoretically one of 
the main predictions of the financial flexibility paradigm, that is the firm's leverage is inversely related 
to the expectations about future shocks to the firm's investment opportunity set.  This is because in the 
case where an investment shock is expected, the firm acts proactively and it decreases its leverage to 
preserve a greater debt capacity today to meet its future expected borrowing.1  De Angelo et al. (2016) 
document that proactive deleveraging is the norm among firms.   
 Being motivated by the above evidence and theory, we explore whether manager’s expectations 
for future investment shocks affect firm's current leverage. We measure the expectations for future 
"small" (diffusive) and "large" (jumps) investment shocks by extracting the stock returns risk-neutral 
volatility and risk-neutral kurtosis, respectively, from the market prices of a cross-section of liquid 
equity options.2  Options prices are forward-looking and hence they provide a natural venue to proxy 
market expectations.  We use the Bakshi et al. (2003) model-free formulae to calculate risk-neutral 
volatility and risk-neutral kurtosis for all firms that belong to any of the S&P LargeCap 500, S&P 
                                                          
1 DeAngelo et al. (2011) show that debt is the least costly source of capital for a firm when a realized shock dictates 
financing.  Debt has a tax advantage and it is also subject to lower adverse selection costs relative to equity.  Furthermore, 
stockpiling cash is also costly because it creates agency costs that lower the firm value. 
2 Gorbenko and Strebulaev (2010) develop a dynamic trade-off capital structure model where both types of shocks affect 
the firm's capital structure 
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MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600 indices and which they have available accounting data as well as 
reliable equity option data. Then, we use panel data regressions to estimate the effect of the two risk-
neutral moments (RNMs) on the firms’ leverage ratios in accordance with the empirical capital 
structure literature (e.g., Korajczyk and Levy, 2003, Frank and Goyal, 2009). Given that RNMs may 
also be affected by leverage, we address concerns on the effect of endogeneity by providing further 
evidence using a set of instruments for RNMs dictated by previous literature (e.g., Taylor et al., 2009, 
Hansis et al., 2010). We also explore whether the documented relation between RNMs and leverage is 
consistent with a financial distress rather than a financial flexibility explanation; an increase (decrease) 
in RNMs may be a manifestation of an increase (decrease) in the firm’s probability of default and thus 
managers decrease (increase) leverage.  Finally, we explore the relative impact of RNMs on leverage 
across constrained and unconstrained groups of firms, as DeAngelo’s model predicts that constrained 
firms have a greater need for financial flexibility.  
 One point is in order regarding the validity of the implicit assumption which underlies our 
approach to proxy firm's managers’ expectations with stock investor's expectations for future shocks 
to stock prices. In line with Andres et al. (2014), we assume that the firm managers who set leverage, 
also participate as investors in the stock market where these risk-neutral moments (RNMs) are 
extracted from.  This is a plausible assumption because managers own considerable parts of their 
companies' shares (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2009, Holderness, 2009) as they often receive stocks and 
stock options as part of their compensation scheme (Frydman and Saks, 2010).  In addition, there is 
empirical evidence that managers tend to trade in their own firms' stock (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001, 
Jeng et al., 2003). 
 We find that expectations for diffusive shocks and jumps are inversely related to the firm's 
leverage.  Specifically, an increase (decrease) in risk-neutral volatility and risk-neutral kurtosis 
decreases (increases) leverage.  These findings hold over and above of standard controls for the firm’s 
leverage, they are not subject to an endogeneity bias and they are in accordance with DeAngelo et al. 
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(2011) model's predictions.  In the case where managers expect a shock, they decrease the firm's 
leverage.  They do so to increase the reserves of untapped borrowing power of the firm so that the firm 
can access the debt markets and address its funding needs if the shock is realized.  The RNMs retain 
their significance and sign even when we control for the firm's probability of default.  This confirms 
that the documented effect of RNMs on the capital structure cannot be explained by a probability of 
default story and it renders further support to the financial flexibility explanation. 
Our analysis provides further support to the above evidence.  The variance decomposition 
reveals that the expectations for the future shocks account for a significant fraction of the leverage 
variation controlling for other standard determinants of firm’s leverage (18.3% to 43.1% across 
alternative model specifications). Moreover, a comparison of our model which explains leverage in 
terms of the two RNMs and standard determinants of leverage versus the previously employed models 
which exclude the two RNMs reveals that the inclusion of RNMs increases R2 significantly, from 
11.3% to 27.2% across alternative model specifications.  Interestingly, we find that firms’ managers 
set the current quarter’s leverage ratio by also taking into account expectations for longer horizons’ 
shocks, i.e. shocks expected to be realized at times beyond the period (quarter) over which they will 
reset their leverage.  This is again in accordance with DeAngelo et al. (2011) who show theoretically 
that in the case where managers believe that shocks are serially correlated, they take into account 
expectations for longer horizon shocks when making financing decisions. 
We also find that the leverage of the more financially constrained firms is more sensitive to 
expectations for shocks, as expected under the financial flexibility paradigm.  The greater the risk that 
a firm will not be able to respond to a future shock by accessing capital markets, the greater the debt 
capacity it needs to preserve today and thus the lower the leverage. Finally, we find that results are 
robust to potential effects from macroeconomic fluctuations, the financial crisis of 2008, the firm’s 
ownership structure, CEO attributes, location (physical, and the jurisdiction of incorporation), and 
R&D intensity. In sum, our results confirm the theoretical predictions of DeAngelo et al. (2011) and 
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the results of Graham and Harvey (2001), Bancel and Mitoo (2004) and Brounen et al. (2006) surveys 
which find that managers seek for financial flexibility when they set the firm’s leverage ratio. 
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, our findings contribute to the growing 
literature which explores the implications of financial flexibility for capital structure decisions. The 
financial flexibility paradigm has two testable implications related to capital structure decisions 
(DeAngelo et al., 2011).  The first is that new investments are mostly financed with debt; a number of 
papers have empirically confirmed this prediction (Marchica and Mura, 2010, Denis and McKeon, 
2012, DeAngelo and Roll 2014, Hess and Immenkötter, 2014, Ferrando et al., 2017).  The second is 
that firms decrease leverage when future small or large investment shocks are expected in order to 
preserve a greater debt capacity today to meet their future expected borrowing. In this paper, we test 
the latter implication.3  Our paper complements Byoun (2011, 2016) who tests the implications of the 
financial flexibility paradigm by exploring the financing choices of firms conditional on their future 
growth opportunities and financing needs that these would require. To this end, he uses a number of 
accounting variables to proxy the firm’s future growth opportunities.  We proxy expectations for future 
shocks in the firm’s investment opportunity set, which can be viewed as future growth opportunities 
for the firm. Indirectly, we also proxy expectations for future financing needs, given that the firm will 
                                                          
3 There is a concurrent study by Borochin and Yang (BY, 2017) who explore the effect of equity options-implied 
information on leverage.  However, there is an important difference between BY and our study. Our study explores one of 
the main implications of the financial flexibility paradigm, that in the case where an investment shock is expected, the firm 
acts proactively and it decreases its leverage to preserve a greater debt capacity today to meet its future expected borrowing.  
To test this implication, we use the risk-neutral volatility and risk-neutral kurtosis of stock returns to capture expectations 
about small and large investment shocks, respectively.  Then, we convert stock return volatility to asset volatility to control 
for the “leverage effect” on volatility (Christie, 1982). This transformation enables us to test the theory.  On the contrary, 
BY use stock return option-based measures without controlling for the “leverage effect” on stock returns volatility measure.  
The two studies also differ in other respects, too. We use pure option-based measures of expectations of future shocks 
which are forward-looking measures by construction whereas BY use measures such as the variance risk premium which 
is partly forward looking because it also contains information from past data (i.e. the one required to estimate the physical 
volatility which is part of the variance risk premium).  In addition, we test whether our results are subject to endogeneity, 
whereas BY do not.  
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decide to exploit these opportunities, should they realize.  Different from these two papers though, our 
study uses forward-looking market-based variables to proxy the firm’s future growth opportunities. 
Grullon et al., (2012) and Ai and Kiku (2016) find that market-based volatility measures of future 
corporate growth provide contain more information about the firm’s future investment opportunities 
compared to conventional accounting-based measures.  However, these are historical measures of 
volatility which may reflect a financial distress rather than an expectations effect on leverage.4  
Second, our approach to use RNMs to measure managers' expectations about shocks to future 
investment contributes to the extensive literature which views market option prices as a market-based 
estimate of investors’ expectations to address a number of questions in finance for policy questions, 
asset management and asset pricing, risk management, stock selection and portfolio choice purposes 
(e.g., Bates, 1991, Kostakis et al., 2011, Faccini et al., 2018, Hiraki and Skiadopoulos, 2019, and 
Jackwerth, 2004, Christoffersen et al., 2012, Giamouridis and Skiadopoulos, 2012, Bali et al., 2016 
for reviews).  Two remarks are in order at this point.  First, we acknowledge that the RNMs represent 
the expectations of a risk-neutral investor.  Nevertheless, the RNMs are related to the moments of the 
physical distribution; the risk-neutral distribution is the product of the pricing kernel times the physical 
distribution.  Therefore, RNMs convey information about the expectations of market participants.  
Second, we do not claim that RNMs forecast realized shocks accurately.  However, this is not a concern 
for the purposes of our study.  We employ RNMs simply as a forward-looking measure extracted from 
market prices to proxy market participants' expectations for future shocks. 
                                                          
4 There is also another strand of literature, which explores how corporate cash management policies are affected when 
firms seek for financial flexibility. Firms have an incentive to build cash reserves in order to be able to fund future 
investment opportunities, without having to resort to costly external finance. This precautionary motive will be a positive 
function of the firm’s need for external funds (e.g., firms with more volatile cash flows) and the cost of external funds. 
There is a special issue in the Journal of Corporate Finance (Denis, 2011) on this topic, i.e. the implications of financial 
flexibility on corporate cash management policies. Different to this strand of literature, our paper explores the implications 
of financial flexibility for capital structure decisions. 
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 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the sample 
construction. Section 3 presents the method for calculating the risk-neutral moments. In Section 4 we 
present the baseline empirical analysis and robustness tests. In Section 5 we explore whether the effects 
of expectations on leverage prevail once the firm’s probability of default is taken into account. In 
Section 6 we explore the effect of expectations on leverage once we take financial constraints into 
account and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Datasets  
We collect quarterly firm-level accounting data and daily equity options data from Compustat North 
America and OptionMetrics Ivy DB database, respectively.  Data span 1996:Q1 to 2017:Q4, as data 
on equity options are available from 1996 onwards.  We match firm-level data from the two databases 
using eight-digit CUSIP numbers.  Our sample consists of all firms that belong to any of the S&P 
LargeCap 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600 indices and have available accounting and 
equity option data.5  We choose to confine the sample to firms belonging to these benchmark indices 
because the equity options written on the stocks of these firms are the most liquid among the universe 
of U.S. traded equity options (for a similar sample choice in the corporate finance literature dictated 
by the liquidity of the derivatives’ market, see Saretto and Tookes, 2013).   
 We filter accounting data in line with the previous literature.  We exclude financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), because their capital structure is significantly 
affected by regulatory factors.  Furthermore, we only use firm-quarters in which firms have non-
missing data for any of the variables of interest.  Moreover, we exclude firm-quarters with firms having 
                                                          
5 At any point in time, participation in these indices is mutually exclusive.  That is, a firm cannot belong to more than one 
index at the same time. 
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non-positive book assets, book equity or market equity and negative debt or total liabilities.  To avoid 
the effect of misreported data and outliers, we winsorize all final variables at the 1st and the 99th 
percentiles. Once we have applied filters, our sample consists of 817 firms. Over our sample period, 
264 of these firms were became inactive, either because they defaulted, were delisted or merged with 
other companies. This ensures that our dataset includes both the firms that were successful and 
survived as well as the firms that failed. Hence our results are not biased towards successful companies. 
 Regarding the equity options data, we use the daily implied volatilities provided by Ivy DB for 
each traded contract (source: Option price files).  These are calculated by the Cox, Ross, and 
Rubinstein (1979) model based on the midpoint of bid and ask option prices ; individual equity options 
are American style.  We filter the options’ data to remove any noise in the corresponding implied 
volatilities.  We only consider out-of-the-money (OTM) and at-the-money options with time-to-
maturity of at least 5 days.  We also discard options with zero open interest, zero bid price, and 
premiums below 3/8 $.  In addition, we retain only option contracts that do not violate Merton's (1973) 
no-arbitrage conditions for American options and have implied volatilities less than 100%.  As a proxy 
for the risk-free rate, we use the zero curves provided by IvyDB.  IvyDB provides continuously 
compounded zero rates which have been constructed based on the term structure of U.S. LIBOR rates 
(ranging from one week up to twelve months), as well as on the settlement prices of the Chicago 
Mercantile (CME) Eurodollar futures.  We interpolate linearly across the two closest available 
maturities to obtain the rate for maturities beyond the provided ones.  We also obtain data on expected 
dividend payments over the life of each option contract and their timing from IvyDB.   
 For some firms the fiscal ear does not coincide with the calendar year, so we need to collect 
monthly instead of quarterly data on other variables to accommodate for this. Then variables are 
synchronized based on the last month of each fiscal quarter, e.g. the value of an accounting variable 
for the fiscal quarter that ends on May will be matched with the value of a monthly variable for May.  
We obtain monthly data on the number of analysts following a firm, monthly data on the analysts’ 
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forecasts (mean forecast and standard deviation of forecasts) regarding the earnings per share from the 
Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and daily data on the trading volume of stocks and 
equity options per firm from Compustat North America and OptionMetrics Ivy DB database, 
respectively.  We also obtain daily data on the put/call ratio from OptionMetrics Ivy DB database. 
We obtain annual data on CEO attributes and managerial ownership from ExecuCopm database 
and quarterly data on institutional ownership from Thomson-Reuters 13F database.  We convert the 
annual frequency to quarterly by setting the value of a variable for each quarter within a year equal to 
the value of the variable for that particular year.  Finally, we obtain monthly data on equity market 
return from CRSP and quarterly data on the aggregate nonfinancial corporate profit growth and GDP 
growth from the Federal Reserve Board and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis websites, respectively. 
 
3. Calculation of risk-neutral moments 
We extract the risk-neutral volatility and risk-neutral kurtosis from market option prices using the 
model-free methodology suggested by Bakshi et al. (2003, BKM hereafter). 
3.1. BKM method: Description 
Let S(t) be the price of the underlying asset at time t adjusted by the present values of dividends, 
( ) ( )( , ) ln lnR t S t S tτ τ≡ + −        the τ -period log- return and r the continuously compounded risk-
free rate computed at time t which corresponds to horizon τ.  The computed at time t model-free risk-
neutral volatility ( ( , )IV t τ  ) and kurtosis ( ( , )KURT t τ  ) of the log-returns distribution with horizon τ 
are given by: 
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where V(t, τ), W(t,τ) and X(t,τ) are the fair values of three artificial contracts (volatility, cubic and 
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The prices of the three contracts can be computed as a linear combination of out-of-the-money call 
and put options: 
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where C( t , ;K )τ  and P( t , ;K )τ  are the call and put prices with strike price Κ and time to maturity τ. 
3.2. BKM method: Implementation 
To compute the two RNMs [equations (1) and (2)]The implementation of equations (5), (6), and (7) 
requires a continuum of OTM call and OTM put options across strikes.  However, market option quotes 
are available only for a bounded finite range of discrete strike prices.  This will incur a bias in the 
calculation of RNMs (Dennis and Mayhew, 2002, and Jiang and Tian, 2005).  In addition, we need to 
extract constant maturity RNNs to eliminate the effect of the shrinking time to maturity on the RNMs 
as time goes by.   
To address both issues, once we apply the data filters described in Section 2 to any given date, 
we extract the expirations for which at least two OTM puts and two OTM calls are traded.  We discard 
maturities that do not satisfy this requirement.  We also discard any maturity for which there is no data 
on at least one call option with delta smaller than 0.25 and one put option with delta larger than 0.75.  
We do this to ensure that the computed RNMs reflect a wide range of option strike prices.  Then, we 
fit a Hermite cubic spline through the implied volatilities for each available maturity as a function of 
moneyness (defined as the ratio of the underlying price to the strike price).  We evaluate this spline at 
an equally spaced moneyness grid of 1000 points with minimum moneyness 0.01 and maximum 
moneyness 3.  This yields for each maturity 1000 pairs of moneyness and implied volatilities (for a 
similar approach, see Rehman and Vilkov, 2012, Chang et al., 2013, Neumann and Skiadopoulos, 
2013).  For each one of these 1,000 moneyness levels, we fit a cubic spline in the maturity dimension 
and evaluate it at the target maturity; we calculate the RNMs on a daily level for fixed maturities 3, 6 
and 12 months.  For moneyness levels below (above) the smallest (largest) available moneyness level 
in the market, we extrapolate the implied volatility of the lowest (highest) available strike price 
horizontally.  If the target expiration is below the smallest available traded expiration, a constant 
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maturity implied volatility curve is not constructed to avoid any noise from extrapolation in the time 
to maturity dimension. 
 Finally, we convert the moneyness grid and the corresponding constant maturity implied 
volatilities to the associated strike and option prices via the Black and Scholes (1973) model.6  To 
account for any dividends expected to be paid over the life of the constant maturity option, we adjust 
the underlying price by the present value of the expected dividends (for a similar approach, see e.g., 
Dumas et al., 1998).  Then, we compute the constant maturity moments [equations (1), (2), and (3)] 
by evaluating the integrals in formulae (6), (7), and (8) using trapezoidal approximation.   
 In line with Bakshi et al. (2003) and Conrad et al. (2013), we average the daily RNM over the 
period of interest (quarter) to diminish the effect of any outliers in risk-neutral moments that may still 
be present on a daily level.  The application of the filtering constraints to the options’ data, delivers a 
different sample size for the RNMs across the different horizons.  As a result, the sample size of the 
firms' panel which is matched with the RNMs differs across the different horizons.  The use of 3-






                                                          
6 The use of the Black-Scholes (1973) model to convert implied volatilities to option prices does not introduce a bias even 
though we use American options.  This is because we use only short maturity (less than six months), out-of-the money 
options which have a very small early exercise premium (see Barone-Adesi and Whaley, 1987, for an extensive analysis 
of these points). 
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4. Leverage and expectations about future shocks 
4.1. Empirical specification  
To explore the effects of expectations about future shocks on leverage, we run the following fixed-
effects panel regression:  
 , , , , ,i t i i t i t i tL a RNM FLτβ γ ε= + + +   (8) 
Equation (8) describes the leverage ratio ( ),i tL  of the ith firm measured at quarter t as a function of the 
vector of RNMs ( ), ,i tRNM τ  implied by τ-maturity equity options of firm i measured at time t; the vector 
includes the risk-neutral volatility and kurtosis for each firm. RNMs are concurrent to the leverage 
ratio, as current expectations of future investment shocks affect contemporaneous leverage decisions. 
In equation (8), we also include firm fixed effects ia  and a vector of standard firm-level ( ),i tFL  
determinants of leverage proposed by the previous literature.  Firm fixed effects (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) incorporate any 
unobserved firm-specific time invariant effects.  The inclusion of firm fixed effects is required given 
that previous literature on firm leverage models (Lemmon et al. 2008) concludes that a substantial part 
of leverage variation is driven by firm-specific time invariant effects which are not captured by 
previously identified determinants.  
We measure leverage by book (i.e., accounting) and market values, separately, since there is no 
consensus in the previous literature on which one of the two measures of leverage is better (e.g., Huang 
and Ritter, 2009).  The former is measured as book debt divided by total assets and the latter as book 
debt divided by the sum of the market value of equity and book debt at time t.  We convert stock 
returns risk-neutral volatility to asset risk-neutral volatility to control for the “leverage effect” on 
volatility (Christie, 1982), which states that when stock prices decrease (increase), firms become more 
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(less) levered, raising (lowering) the volatility of stock returns.7 In line with Welch (2004), Faulkender 
and Petersen (2006) and Frank and Goyal (2009), we perform the conversion from the stock return to 
the asset value metric by multiplying the equity volatility with the equity-to-asset ratio of the firm. 8   
In the case of the risk-neutral kurtosis, there is no need to perform a conversion because kurtosis is 
invariant to linear transformations.  Hence, the risk-neutral kurtosis of stock returns equals the risk-
neutral kurtosis of asset returns.   
The set of firm-level variables ( ),i tFL  controls for the effect of agency costs, asymmetric information, 
default risk and tax shield variability on leverage.  Following Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
Hovakimian and Li (2011) and Faulkender at el. (2012), we use the following set of firm-level 
variables: 
• INDUSTRY: Industry median leverage.  Within any quarter, it is defined as the median 
leverage ratio among all firms of the industry (defined by two-digit SIC codes) that the firm 
belongs to.  The industry median leverage proxies industry factors that affect leverage, such as 
business risk and regulation, and is expected to have a positive effect on the firm’s leverage 
• MB: Market-to-book ratio of assets. It is calculated as the sum of book liabilities and market 
value of equity divided by book assets. It proxies a firm's growth opportunities.  Firms with 
                                                          
7 We checked whether this transformation may have an effect on the results of our subsequent analysis.  To this end, we 
repeated the subsequent analysis without applying this transformation. The results were affected, as the relation between 
risk-neutral volatility turns from negative to positive. However, this could be the result of the “leverage effect”.  A decrease 
in the firm’s stock rice would increase at the same time the firm’s leverage ratio and the stock return volatility, creating a 
positive relation between the two variables. By converting to asset volatility, we control for this effect.   
8 In line with Welch (2004), Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Frank and Goyal (2009), we switch from the stock returns 
metric to the asset metric by assuming that the variance of debt equals zero.  Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008, Table 7, page 
10) find that the asset volatility is the same regardless of whether one assumes zero debt volatility or she estimates debt 
volatility using investment grade bonds.  They use the Fixed Income Securities Database; unfortunately we have no access 
to this database to verify their results.  However, 97.9% of the firms with rated debt in our sample also issue investment 
grade bonds.   
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high growth potential are more concerned about the debt overhang problem and thus they are 
expected to have lower leverage.9 
• ASSETS: Natural log of book assets expressed in 2009 U.S. dollars as a measure of firm size.  
Large firms are considered to have lower default risk and investors possess more information 
about them. Therefore, they are considered to have higher debt capacity and hence a greater 
leverage. 
• PROF: Profitability calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
divided by the book value of assets.  More profitable firms are expected to be less levered 
because the availability of internally generated funds reduces the need to resort to costly debt 
financing. Furthermore, retained earnings may mechanically reduce the firm's book leverage 
ratio.  
• TANG: Tangibility, calculated as net property, plant and equipment divided by book assets. 
Tangibility proxies collateral.  Firms operating mostly with fixed assets are expected to have a 
greater leverage because they have a greater debt capacity, given that fixed assets have a high 
liquidation value in case of default.  
• DEP: Depreciation expenses, calculated as depreciation and amortization divided by book 
assets. Depreciation expenses proxy for non-debt tax shields.  The greater the depreciation 
expenses of a firm, the less the need for interest expenses to reduce taxable income, and thus 
the lower the leverage ratio  
• SELL: Selling expenses, calculated as selling, general and administrative expenses divided by 
sales. Selling expenses proxy the degree of uniqueness of the firm, i.e., how easily replaceable 
are the assets of the firm by the assets of another firm. Specialized assets have a lower expected 
                                                          
9 According to the debt overhang problem, the greater the leverage of a firm, the greater the probability that it will forgo 
positive net present value projects. This happens because the share of the firm's future proceeds received by current 




liquidation value.  Thus, firms with highly specialized assets are expected to have a lower debt 
capacity.    
Table 1 reports the sample summary statistics. Three samples are formed based on the respective 
RNMs three horizons (3, 6 and 12-months) under scrutiny. The size of each sample is determined by 
the availability of RNMs and of accounting data used to construct the measures of leverage and the set 
of control variables ( ),i tFL  . As expected, book leverage ratios are on average higher than market 
leverage ratios, given that the book value of equity is usually lower than the market value for equity.    
4.2. Results and discussion 
We use RNMs extracted for three different time horizons 3, 6 and 12 months.  We use three different 
time horizons to examine whether expectations for longer horizon shocks may also matter for leverage 
determination.  Firms’ managers may set the current quarter's leverage by taking into account 
expectations for longer horizons shocks, too.  DeAngelo et al. (2011) show that this is the case when 
managers believe that shocks are serially correlated. .   
First, we perform a preliminary assessment of the relation between leverage and RNMs by sorting 
firms in two high and low volatility (kurtosis) groups. At any given date and for any given time horizon, 
we trace the median value for risk-neutral volatility (kurtosis) across all firm-quarters in our panel. 
Then, we sort firms with RNMs greater (smaller) than the media in the high (low) group.  De Angelo 
(2011) model predicts that firms which belong in the low risk-neutral volatility and kurtosis groups 
should have higher leverage ratios than the firms which belong in the high RNMs groups.  
Columns (1) and (2) [(4) and (5)] of Table 2 present the average and median values for leverage across 
the two volatility (kurtosis) groups. Consistent with the predictions of De Angelo (2011) model that 
expectations for future shocks decrease leverage, both the average and the median leverage ratios of 
the low-volatility group are greater than these of the high-volatility group. This holds for both market 
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and book leverage. In the case of kurtosis, the results are mixed, as neither book nor market leverage 
are consistently higher in one of two groups across all time horizons. These results are based on 
univariate sorts and they do not control for other variables which may affect leverage.   
Next, to provide a deeper understanding of the relation between leverage and the expectations 
for future shocks, we assess the relation between leverage and RNMs by means of panel regressions. 
We estimate two alternative specifications of equation (8) for each time horizon, for the cases where 
we use market and book leverage as a dependent variable, respectively.  In line with Petersen (2009), 
we conduct statistical inference by using Cameron et al. (2011) and Thompson (2011) standard errors 
clustered by firm. Table 3, reports the results for the cases where managers take into account 
expectations for shocks over the next three (columns (1) and (2)), six (columns (3) and (4)) and twelve-
month (columns (5) and (6)) period, when leverage is measured by market and book leverage, 
respectively.  
 In line with previous capital structure papers (Huang and Ritter, 2009, Hovakimian and Li, 
2012), Table 3 reports the within-firm adjusted R2 defined to be the explained variation of leverage 
that is attributable to all explanatory variables but the firm fixed effects (i.e. the firm specific constant). 
Given that firm fixed effects can artificially inflate the conventional adjusted R2 (Lemmon et al., 2008), 
the within-firm adjusted R2 provides a more accurate estimate for the explanatory power of RNMs and 
other control variables compared to the estimate provided by the conventional adjusted R2.  To obtain 
the within-firm R2, we time-demean the data and estimate the following equation: 
 ,, , , , ,( ( () ) )iii t i t i t i ti iL RNM FL FLL RNM ττβ γ ε ε− − − −= + +  (9) 
Where iL  is the time series average leverage of the ith firm.  The estimation of equation (9), known as 
within estimation, yields the same estimates for slope coefficients ( , )β γ  as the estimation of equation 
(8).   The within-firm R2 is the adjusted R2 obtained from the estimation of equation (9)  
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 Three remarks are in order regarding our findings.  First, we can see that expectations for future 
shocks are significant even when we control for well-known determinants of leverage.  The 
coefficients for the risk-neutral volatility and risk-neutral kurtosis are negative and statistically 
significant in all specifications and time horizons.  These findings are consistent with the predictions 
of the DeAngelo et al. (2011) model.  The reported significance suggests that expectations about future 
shocks affect the way that managers set their leverage today.  In addition, the fact that both the risk-
neutral variance and kurtosis are significant suggests that managers are concerned about both the 
variation of (“normal”, also termed “diffusive”) future shocks as well as about the occurrence of 
extreme shocks.  The negative coefficient of the two RNMs suggest that managers decrease leverage 
in the case where they expect that the variation of shocks will increase and /or more extreme shocks 
are likely to happen.10  Second, the fact that changes in the six and twelve month risk-neutral volatility 
and kurtosis also affect leverage indicates that managers may set the current quarter leverage ratio by 
taking into account expectations for longer horizons shocks, i.e. shocks to be realized at times beyond 
the next quarter, too 
 Third, we can see that all control variables but depreciation expenses have the expected sign, 
albeit some of them are not significant across all specifications and time-horizons.  The empirical 
evidence on the effect of depreciation expenses on leverage is mixed.  Hovakimian and Li (2011) find 
a positive whereas Faulkender and Rangan (2006) find a negative relation.  
 
 
                                                          
10 Welch (2004) finds that part of the variation in market leverage ratios is mechanical in the sense that it is due to changes 
in the market value of the firm's equity.  He argues that once the change in the market value of the firm's equity is accounted 
for, some of the previously identified leverage determinants become statistically insignificant.  In unreported tests, we re-
run all market leverage regressions augmented with the firm's stock quarterly return. We find that the results on the 
significance and effect of RNMs to firm’s leverage do not change.  
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4.3. Expectations of future shocks versus standard determinants of leverage 
We assess the importance of expectations about future shocks relative to that of the determinants 
suggested by the previous literature.  To this end, we examine the contribution of the two RNMs to the 
goodness of fit of the model described by equation (8) (full model) relative to the goodness of fit 
obtained from employing a nested version of equation (8) which uses only the traditional leverage 
determinants.  The second to last and the last rows of Table 3 report the within-firm adjusted R2 of the 
full and nested versions of equation (8), respectively. The within-firm adjusted R2 in the three-month 
specification increases by 10.1% (17%) in the case of the market (book) leverage when we include the 
two RNMs in the specifications.  The within-firm adjusted R2 increases   by 16% (20.6%) and 21.3% 
(21.4%) when we consider market (book) leverage for the three-month and twelve-month cases, 
respectively. 
Due to space limitations, in the remaining of the paper, we will only report results for the case 
where we examine the relation between leverage and the six-month RNMs, and we will be discussing 
results for the three- and twelve- month RNMs. We select to report results for the six-month horizon 
because it yields the greatest number of observations among the three horizons. 
 Next, we conduct a variance decomposition of leverage to determine the fraction of explained 
variation of the dependent variable that is attributable to the RNMs.  Following Lemmon et al. (2008), 
we employ the framework of analysis of covariance (ANCOVA).  For each model specification, we 
calculate the partial Type III explained sum of squares of each explanatory variable.  This is calculated 
as follows.  For each explanatory variable, we estimate equation (9) after excluding the particular 
variable.  Next, we obtain the explained sum of squares (ESS) defined as the sum of the squares of the 
deviations of the fitted leverage values from the mean leverage value of this regression.  The difference 
between the ESS of this model and the ESS of the model that includes the particular variable is the 
partial Type III ESS for the particular variable.  It expresses the explained variation of the dependent 
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variable that is attributable to the particular explanatory variable once all other explanatory variables 
have been taken into account.  The sum of the partial Type III ESS of all explanatory variables in the 
model equals the ESS of the model that includes all variables. 
 Panel A of Table 4 reports the variance decomposition results for the specifications which 
include the 6-month RNMs.  Columns (1) and (2) correspond to the specifications that include market 
and book leverage, respectively. In each column, the entry for a particular variable is calculated as the 
ratio of the partial Type III ESS of that variable over the sum of the partial Type III ESS of all 
explanatory variables in the model.  Thus, every column adds to 100%.  Hence, each entry expresses 
the percentage of the within-firm adjusted R2 that is attributable to a particular explanatory variable.  
Entries in columns (1) and (2) show that the risk-neutral volatility captures 19% and 27.8% of leverage 
variation in the market and book leverage specifications, respectively. Most importantly, risk-neutral 
volatility has greater explanatory power – in terms of explained leverage variation – compared to all 
other determinants, with the exception of industry median leverage. This is consistent with the findings 
of Lemmon et al. (2008), who document that the industry median leverage is the most influential 
identified leverage determinant.  The results are similar in the 3-month and 12-month specifications 
where risk-neutral volatility captures 14% to 25% and 24.6% to 26.2% of the leverage explained 
variation, respectively.  Risk-neutral kurtosis accounts for a relatively smaller fraction of leverage 
variation, ranging from 0.6% to 18.5% depending on the specification and the time horizon of the 
RNMs. In sum, the RNMs account for 18.3% to 43.1% of leverage variation, depending on the 
specification and the time horizon of the RNMs. For each individual specification, the RNMs have a 
greater explanatory power – in terms of explained leverage variation – compared to all other 
determinants, with the exception of industry median leverage. 
 Panel B of Table 4 reports the economic significance of the estimated coefficients in equation 
(8). Columns (3) and (4) correspond to the specifications that include market and book leverage, 
respectively. From an economic perspective, our calculations show that a one standard deviation 
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increase in risk-neutral volatility decreases market (book) leverage by 3.1% (3.1%) and a one standard 
deviation increase in risk-neutral kurtosis decreases market (book) leverage by 2% (0.9%). Risk-
neutral volatility outperforms all other determinants but industry median leverage, while kurtosis 
outperforms half of the other determinants. This effect is similar regardless of the horizon under 
scrutiny (results are available upon request).  
4.4. Are results subject to an endogeneity bias? 
In the previous subsections, we regressed leverage on the RNMs by controlling for a set of common 
determinants of leverage.  However, an endogeneity issue may arise; the firm’s leverage may also 
affect the RNMs (e.g., Taylor et al., 2009, Hansis et al., 2010).  To check whether our results are 
subject to an endogeneity bias, we perform a two stage least squares (TSLS) instrumental variable 
estimation.  We choose instruments that proxy the heterogeneity of investors’ beliefs and market 
sentiment, and are uncorrelated with leverage. Hansis et al. (2010) findings imply that the 
heterogeneity of analysts’ beliefs affects risk-neutral volatility and risk-neutral kurtosis.  In addition, 
the heterogeneity of beliefs (Shefrin, 2001, Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006, Friesen et al., 2012) and market 
sentiment (Han, 2008, Lemmon and Ni, 2011) are related to the slope of the implied volatility curve 
and hence they are related to the risk-neutral kurtosis.  Hence, we fix a menu of five instruments for 
the two RNMs.  These are the stock’s trading volume, the option/stock trading volume ratio, the 
number of analysts following the firm, the dispersion of analysts' forecasts and the put/call ratio.  In 
line with previous literature (Taylor 2009, Hansis et al., 2010), we consider the first four variables as 
measures of investors’ heterogeneity of beliefs (a greater value for each one of these variables is taken 
to manifest greater information asymmetries) and we use the put/call ratio as a measure of sentiment.   
For any given firm, we calculate the stocks (options) trading volume as the log of the daily 
average over a quarter of the number of traded stocks (option contracts).  The number of analysts is 
the monthly average over a quarter of the number of analysts following a firm, i.e. analysts that report 
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estimates for the next annual earnings announcement.  The dispersion of analysts' forecasts is the 
monthly average over the quarter of the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings per share forecasts for 
a firm for the next annual earnings announcement divided by the absolute value of the mean estimate.  
The put/call ratio is the daily average over a quarter of the ratio of the trading volume of firm-specific 
put options to call options. 
We check the validity of our instruments and conduct the TSLS estimation as follows. First, 
for any given horizon, we check the relevance condition for this menu of instruments and determine 
which instruments to use.  We take a general to specific approach by considering all possible 
combinations of instruments and we retain the variables that satisfy the relevance condition as 
instruments; we examine combinations because the number of instruments has to be at least equal to 
the number of endogenous regressors for the purposes of testing, hence in our case at least two.  We 
use Sanderson-Windmeijer (2016) to test the relevance condition. This tests whether any given 
candidate instrument is correlated with each one of the two potentially endogenous RNMs. We define 
the optimal set of instruments to be the one which satisfies the relevance condition. The exclusivity 
condition in TSLS estimation can only be tested if the number of instruments exceeds the number of 
potentially endogenous variables. Hence, if the chosen set of instruments consists of more than two 
instruments, we also check whether it satisfies the exclusivity criterion, using Hansen’s J-statistic.  
This tests whether any given instrument is uncorrelated with the error term in equation (8). Once we 
decide on the suitability of instruments, we perform the TSLS estimation to check whether the 
coefficients of the instrumented RNMs retain the negative sign and significance as the coefficients of 
RNMs do. In case they do not, then this would imply that the previously reported findings are subject 
to an endogeneity bias. 
Table 5 reports results from the TSLS estimation for the case where we examine the six-month 
RNMs. The optimal set of instruments for the six-month horizon consists of the dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts and the stocks trading volume We can see that there is a negative and statistically significant 
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relation between leverage and the RNM instruments for both the book and market leverage 
specifications. Regarding the results for the other two horizons, the results are similar. Most 
importantly, there is a negative and statistically significant relation between leverage and RNMs for 
the specifications in both horizons.  The optimal set of instruments for the three- month horizon is the 
options/stocks trading volume ratio (O/S), the put/call ratio, and the stocks trading volume, whereas 
for the twelve month horizon is the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, the stocks trading volume and the 
number of analysts. The relevance criterion is satisfied for both the market and book leverage 
specifications for the twelve-month horizon and the book leverage specification for the three-month 
horizon. In sum, in 5 out of 6 specifications (book and leverage specifications across the three RNMs 
horizons) RNMs retain their sign and satisfy the instrumental variable estimation criteria. Therefore, 
the relation between leverage and RNMs documented in Section 4 is not subject to an endogeneity 
bias. 
4.5. Further robustness tests 
We conduct a number of further robustness checks.  We test whether the documented effect of RNMs 
prevails its significance when we account for (i) the firm’s research and development (R&D) expenses, 
location (physical, and the jurisdiction of incorporation), ownership structure, CEO attributes, and 
macroeconomic fluctuations, (ii) the number of stock exchanges, on which each firm’s shares are 
traded,  (iii) the effect of the global financial crisis of 2008, and (iv) the liquidity of the options dataset 
we use to construct the RNMs.11 
                                                          
11 Another potential concern is whether the growing presence of High Frequency Data affects our results. We have 
computed risk-neutral moments (RNMs) over any given quarter by first computing daily RNMs (obtained from end-of-say 
option prices) and then averaging over the quarter.  Therefore, we have not used any high frequency option data and 
therefore we do not expect our estimates of RNMs to have been affected by high frequency trading (HFT).  HFT is a 
program trading platform that uses powerful computers to transact a large number of orders at fractions of a second.  Of 
course, intra-day, the presence of HFT may affect option prices, however this is unlikely to occur at the very end of the 
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Regarding (i), we include the following control variables in equation (8). Following Flannery and 
Rangan (2006), Hovakimian and Li  (2011) and Faulkender at el. (2012), we replace selling expenses 
with (1) R&D expenses divided by sales after setting missing values to zero, and (2) a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the firm does not report R&D expenses and zero otherwise.  Similar to 
the rational for using selling expenses, R&D expenses proxy the degree of uniqueness of the firm, i.e., 
how easy it is to replace the assets of the firm by the assets of another firm. Specialized assets have a 
lower expected liquidation value. Thus, firms with highly specialized assets are expected to have a 
lower debt capacity. 
We also include regional fixed effects in equation (8) to control for each firm’s headquarters 
location and the location, in which each firm is legally registered. We use the eight regions that the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has defined.12 Gao et al (2011) find that the leverage ratio 
of US firms is affected by the location of their headquarters. The financing policy of a firm could be 
affected by several factors related to location such as state laws on corporate takeover and payout 
restrictions, local credit market conditions, local investor preferences, local cultural characteristics and 
social interactions between managers of different firms.  
We use two variables to control for two respective features of the structure of ownership, that 
is institutional and managerial ownership. Moh’d et al (1998) and Grennan et al (2017) find that 
institutional ownership has a negative effect on the leverage ratio of firms because institutional 
investors use their monitoring power on firm’s managers to prevent them from raising the firm’s 
leverage ratio excessively. Moh’d et al (1998) and Chen and Steiner (1999) find that there is a negative 
                                                          
trading day (see for instance Kapetanios, Neumann and Skiadopoulos, 2015 for an analysis of the 24-hour CME options 
market and Kirilenko et al., 2017, for evidence on the flash crash for the stock market). 
12 According to the definition of BEA, these regions are a set of geographic areas that are aggregations of the states. The 
regional classifications are based on the homogeneity of the states in terms of economic characteristics, such as the 
industrial composition of the labor force, and in terms of demographic, social, and cultural characteristics. BEA groups all 
50 states and the District of Columbia into eight distinct regions. 
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relation between a firm’s level of managerial ownership and leverage. Higher managerial ownership 
in a firm aligns the manager’s own interests with those of the shareholders and thus managers are more 
concerned with bankruptcy risks. To control for the level of institutional ownership in firms, for any 
given firm and quarter, we calculate the ratio of the number of shares held by institutional investors to 
the total number of shares outstanding and use this as a control variable in equation (8). To control for 
the level of managerial ownership in firms, for any given firm and quarter, we calculate the percentage 
of total shares outstanding owned by the firm's executives (top managers and directors), including 
options that are exercisable or will become exercisable within 60 days and use this as a control variable 
in equation (8). 
Certain CEO attributes could also have an effect on the financing policy of a firm. We include 
two variables in equation (8) to control for CEO gender and age; one dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the CEO is male and 0 if the CEO is female and one variable measuring CEO age. Graham 
et al. (2013) and Facio et al. (2016) find that firms led by a male CEO have a higher leverage ratio 
compared to firms led by a female CEO. Furthermore, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) argue that older 
CEOs are more risk-averse and are expected to use less debt financing compared to younger CEOs.  
Regarding the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on corporate leverage, Korajczyk and 
Levy (2003) and Leary (2009) find that leverage is countercyclical for financially unconstrained firms 
and procyclical for financially constrained firms in U.S.  Halling et al. (2016) find that leverage is pro-
cyclical in common law countries including U.S.  We include three market-level variables in equation 
(8) to control for the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on leverage. Following Leary (2009), we 
use the one-year real aggregate domestic nonfinancial corporate profit growth, the one-year real stock 
market return and the one-year real GDP growth. 
Table 6 reports the results from estimating equation (8) with the aforementioned variables. 
Panel A (B) reports the results for the specifications with market (book) leverage. Columns (1) to (6) 
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report the results of the specifications that include variables for R&D expenses, headquarters location 
fixed effects, jurisdiction of incorporation fixed effects, ownership structure, CEO attributes and 
macroeconomic fluctuations, respectively. Columns (7) reports the results of the specification that 
includes headquarters location fixed effects and all other variables and (8) jurisdiction of incorporation 
fixed effects and all other variables. We find that the coefficients for the risk-neutral volatility and 
risk-neutral kurtosis remain negative and statistically across all specifications. Results are similar for 
the specifications that include 3-month and 12-month constant maturity RNMs with the exception of 
the 3-month risk-neutral kurtosis in the book leverage specification. 
Regarding (ii), we also test whether our finding that an increase in RNMs decreases leverage 
holds across firms that are cross listed. We identify the stock exchanges, on which each firm’s shares 
trade, from Worldscope database, as Compustat does not provide such information.  We match firm-
level data from the two databases using eight-digit CUSIP numbers. We estimate equation (8) using 
only the firms in our sample that are identified as cross listed, i.e. 329 out of the 798 firms, for which 
6-month RNMs are available. We find that the RNMs prevail their significance and sign. Results are 
similar for the specifications that include 3-month and 12-month constant maturity RNMs. 
Regarding (iii), we control for the potential effect of the financial crisis of 2008 on firms’ 
leverage. Kahle and and Stulz (2013) report that the financial crisis had a different impact on debt and 
equity capital markets; during the financial crisis, the average cumulative decrease in net equity 
issuance was more than twice the average decrease in net debt issuance compared to pre-crisis levels. 
This differential impact could have affected the leverage ratio of firms. We include a time dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 from the third quarter of 2007 until the fourth quarter of 2010 in 
equation (8) to control for the effect of the crisis on corporate leverage. We find that the RNMs prevail 
their significance and sign. Results are similar for the specifications that include 3-month and 12-
month constant maturity RNMs.   
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Finally, we examine whether the results are robust across subsets of our original option dataset 
employed to extract RNMs.  To this end, we segregate options data in deciles by using their liquidity 
as a sorting criterion.  The informational content of option prices in the lower option liquidity decile 
may be lower than that of options in the higher liquidity decile.  In this case, RNMs extracted from the 
lower liquidity decile will be a poorer proxy of managers’ expectations about future shocks. We use 
the options trading volume to measure options’ liquidity.  For any given firm, we calculate the options 
trading volume as the daily average over a quarter of the number of traded option contracts.  Next, we 
sort options in liquidity deciles and estimate equation (8) for each decile (results are available upon 
request).  Table 7 reports the results. We can see that the coefficient for risk-neutral volatility retains 
its sign and significance across all deciles, across all RNMs horizons and across both regression 
specifications (market leverage and book leverage). The coefficient for risk-neutral kurtosis in the 
market leverage specification also retains its significance in all cases. The coefficient for risk-neutral 
kurtosis in the book leverage specification retains its sign and significance in most of the cases. As an 
additional robustness test, we also segregate the data by quartiles and estimate equation (8) for each 
quarter. The results are similar to the ones obtained from the analysis on the liquidity deciles (results 
are available upon request).  In sum, the results indicate that our findings on the significance and effect 
of RNMs to leverage are robust across different option liquidity groups.  This is not surprising given 
that the employed option dataset consists of highly liquid options and hence the informational content 
of option prices is expected to be high even for the low option liquidity groups.       
 
5. What do RNMs reflect? Financial flexibility versus financial distress 
As we discussed, our findings on the effect of market expectations on the firms' leverage is in 
accordance with the DeAngelo (2011) model's predictions regarding financial flexibility as a 
determinant of corporate financial policy.  Alternatively, one could argue that the reported effect of 
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RNMs on leverage reflects a financial distress rather than a financial flexibility effect.. The static trade-
off theory implies that the optimal leverage ratio of a firm is inversely related to the probability of 
default of the firm. An increase in RNMs, i.e. a higher volatility and/or higher kurtosis, might reflect 
that the firm's probability of default increases and thus managers decrease leverage. We explore this 
alternative explanation by including a measure of probability of default on the right-hand side of 
equation (8).  We use three alternative measures to proxy the probability of default. 
Regarding the first measure, we construct a measure for corporate default probability, using 
the results from Campbell, et al. (2011) 13.  Campbell et al. (2011) model the probability of default of 
a firm as a function of observable accounting and market-based variables. They use monthly firm 
failure event data to construct a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm fails in the 
following month and 0 if the firm remains active. Next, they regress this dummy variable on certain 
accounting and market-based variables to test whether a firm’s default can be predicted by these 
variables. We use the estimated coefficients from this regression to construct an index, which we call 
the CHS_Mi,t index. This index measures the probability that a firm will default over the next month 
as a function of the variables. The higher the value of the index, the higher the probability of default, 
because the dummy variable used by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyet al. (2011) takes the value of 1 
if the firms fails and 0 if it remains active. We calculate CHS_Mi,t index as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = −8.63 − 29 × 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁����������𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 3.51 × 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 2.49 × 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 8.02 ×
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁����������𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 1.69 × 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 0.138 × 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 0.05 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 0.974 × 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡            (10)         
Equation (10) describes the construction of the CHS_Mi,t index for the ith firm in quarter t, where 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁����������𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the average ratio of net income to market value of assets over the last four quarters, 
                                                          
13 We selected this model, because Campbell et al (2011) document that it outperforms other leading alternative models 
such as these of Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Distance-to-Default models in terms of forecasting the 
probability of default accurately. 
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i.e. the period spanning quarter t-3 to quarter t, TLMTAi,t denotes the ratio of total liabilities to market 
value of assets, CASHMTAi,t denotes the ratio of cash and short-term investments to market value of 
assets,  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁����������𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the stock’s average excess return relative to the S&P 500 index return over 
the last 12 months, i.e. the period spanning month t-11 to month t, SIGMAi,t denotes the annualized 
stock return standard deviation over the previous 3 months, RSIZEi,t denotes the firm’s equity 
capitalization relative to that of the S&P 500 index, MBi,t denotes the equity market-to-book ratio, and 
PRICEi,t denotes the log of the stock price. The market value of assets is the sum of the firm’s total 
liabilities and market value of equity.   
Campbell et al (2011) also model the probability that a firm will default in the following 12 
months, as opposed to the model in equation (10) which predicts the firm’s probability of default over 
the following month. They construct a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm fails in the 
following 12 months and 0 if the firm remains active and then regress this variable on the 
aforementioned variables.  We use the estimated coefficients from this regression to construct the 
CHS_Yi,t index, which measures the probability that a firm will default over the next 12 months as a 
function of the variables used: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = −8.87 − 20.12 × 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁����������𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 1.60 × 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 2.27 × 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 7.88 ×
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁����������𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 1.55 × 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 0.005 × 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 0.07 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 0.09 × 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡            (11)    
As a second proxy of the firm’s probability of default, in line with Graham (2000), we use 
Altman's (1968) Z-score as modified by Mac-Kie Mason (1990, modified Altman’s Z-score):   
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
3.3 × 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 1.4 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 1.2 × 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡




Equation (12) describes the modified Altman's Z-score for the ith firm in quarter t, where EBIT: 
Earnings before Interest and Taxes, Sales: Total sales, RE: Retained Earnings, and TA: Total Assets. 
The lower the Z-score, the greater is the probability that the firm will default.   
The third measure we use to proxy financial distress risk is cash-flow volatility. Higher cash 
flow volatility is expected to increase the probability of default.  Leary and Roberts (2005) and 
Lemmon et al. (2008) have looked at the relation between leverage and cash-flow volatility. We use 
the standard deviation of the first difference in the firm's historical operating profits (EBITDAi,t – 
EBITDAi,t-1) divided by the mean of total assets to measure cash flow volatility.  Following Mac-Kie 
Mason (1990), for each quarter t we use the last ten observations, i.e., the period spanning quarter t-9 
to quarter t to calculate both the standard deviation of the operating profits and the mean of the total 
assets.  In case data are missing, we require at least six quarters of non-missing data.   
Table 8 reports the results from estimating equation (8) where we include each one of the 
aforementioned measures for probability of default, separately. Columns (1) to (4), (5) and (6), and (7) 
and (8) report the results from estimating the specifications which include the CHS_M and CHS_Y 
indices, the Altman’s Z-score, and cash-flow volatility, respectively.  We find that the RNMs prevail 
their significance and sign across all specifications even once we control for the alternative measures 
for probability of default. Results are similar for the specifications that include 3-month and 12-month 
constant maturity RNMs but the 3-month risk-neutral kurtosis in the book leverage specification that 
includes CHS_Y or Altman’s z-score (results are available upon request (results are available upon 
request). 
Overall, our results indicate that RNMs explain a part of leverage variation which cannot be 
explained by any of the three alternative employed measures for the probability of default. Simply put, 
RNMs provide explanatory power over and above the default probability measures. This indicates that 
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our finding that an increase in RNMs decreases leverage cannot be explained under a probability of 
default perspective. 
 
5. The effect of expectations of shocks and financial constraints  
In this Section, we examine further the effect of expectations for future shocks to the firm's leverage 
when we classify firms according to their ability to obtain external finance to fund their activities.  An 
implication of  DeAngelo et al. (2011) model is that the greater the risk that a firm will not be able to 
respond to a future shock by accessing capital markets, the more the debt capacity it needs to preserve 
today and thus the lower the leverage today.  Hence, the effect of the expectations for shocks on 
leverage is expected to be stronger for the financially constrained firms.  To test this implication, we 
distinguish the financially constrained from the financially unconstrained firms in our sample.  Then, 
we run a regression of an augmented version of equation (8).  We augment the panel regression in 
equation (8) by interacting all variables with a dummy Di,t  that takes the value of one if the firm is 
identified as constrained and zero if the firm is identified as unconstrained:   
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝜏𝜏 + 𝜁𝜁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝜏𝜏 + 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡        (13) 
In this specification, the coefficient vectors ,iα β  and γ  represent the effect of firm fixed effects, risk-
neutral moments 
,( )i tRNM , firm-level factors ,( )i tFL , respectively, on leverage for the group of 
unconstrained firms.  Vectors ,iϕ ζ  and η  represent the differences between the coefficients for the 
group of constrained firms and the group of unconstrained firms. The theory is validated if the 
estimated coefficients for volatility and kurtosis for the unconstrained firms (vector β) and the 
interaction coefficients (vector ζ) have a negative sign. This would imply that the impact of shocks on 
leverage is stronger in absolute terms for the constrained firms as predicted by the theory 
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We use three alternative classification criteria employed by the previous literature to ensure 
that our results are not sensitive to the choice of the classification criterion.  In particular, we classify 
firms according to firm size, the existence of a credit rating, and the financial constraints index 
developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
In line with Hahn and Lee (2009), Campello and Chen (2010) and Hovakimian (2011), we 
classify firms into the constrained and unconstrained groups by using the firm size as a sorting 
criterion.  Small firms are considered to have a more limited access to capital markets due to lower 
collateral availability and higher asymmetric information problems (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).  For 
any given time horizon, we trace the median firm size across all firm-quarters in our panel; we measure 
size as the real (i.e. deflated) market value of assets calculated as the book value of liabilities plus the 
market value of equity.  We classify a firm as small (big) if the market value of its real assets is lower 
(higher) than the sample median.  
 Columns (1) and (2) in Table 8 report the results from estimating equation (13) using the firm 
size variable.  The horizon of RNMs is 6-month.  For brevity, we report results only for risk-neutral 
volatility and kurtosis (coefficient vector β ) and their interaction terms (coefficient vectorζ ).  Given 
that the estimated coefficients for volatility and kurtosis in the large-firm group are negative, the 
negative sign of the interaction coefficients indicates that the impact of shocks on leverage is stronger 
in absolute terms for the small firms as predicted by the theory. In the specifications which include the 
3-month RNMs, the coefficient of the one out four interaction variables (volatility and kurtosis, book 
and market leverage) is negative and statistically significant. In the specifications which include the 
12-month RNMs, all four interaction dummy coefficients are negative and statistical significant.  
Next, in line with Hahn and Lee (2009) and Hovakimian (2011), the second criterion we adopt 
to classify firms in the financially unconstrained and constrained group is whether a firm has a 
commercial paper rating or not, respectively.  Rated firms are considered to be less opaque to investors 
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because they are evaluated by rating agencies and thus they can access capital markets easier 
(Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel, 1994).  Within any given quarter, we classify a firm as 
unconstrained if it has a commercial paper rating.  In addition, we classify a firm as unconstrained if 
it does not have a commercial paper rating, yet it has zero debt.14  The remaining firms are classified 
as financially constrained.  We obtain Standard & Poor’s rating data downloaded from Compustat; 
under this classification, firms are characterized as unconstrained in 43.5% of total firm-quarter 
observations and they are characterized as constrained in the remaining 56.5% of total observations.  
Interestingly, the vast majority of the ratings in the sample are investment-grade.  In particular, 97.9% 
of the ratings are investment-grade, ranging from grade A1 to grade A3, and 2.1% are speculative-
grade, ranging from grade B1 to grade B3.  This ensures that the firm rating in our sample is a 
meaningful criterion to distinguish between constrained and unconstrained firms; if rated firms had 
received a poor rating, then it would be have been debatable whether they are constrained or 
unconstrained.  
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 8 reports results for risk-neutral volatility and kurtosis (coefficient 
vector β ) and their interaction terms (coefficient vector ζ ) for the specifications that include the 6-
month RNMs.  The coefficients for the RNMs are negative in the unconstrained group.  The 
coefficients for the interaction dummy variables for risk-neutral volatility and kurtosis are negative 
and significant across both specifications.  Again, this is in line with DeAngelo et al. (2011) 
                                                          
14 There is no consensus on whether firms that have zero debt in their balance sheet and yet they do not have a credit rating 
should be classified as constrained or unconstrained.  For instance, Hovakimian (2011) classifies them as unconstrained, 
Campello and Chen (2010) classify them as constrained and Hahn and Lee (2009) excludes them from the sample.  One 
may argue that the absence of debt in their balance sheet combined with the lack of a credit rating indicates that these firms 
are completely rationed by private and public debt markets and therefore they should be categorised as financially 
constrained.  Alternatively, one may argue that these firms have chosen to finance themselves solely with equity and thus 
they are not interested in issuing debt, either private or public.  In this case, the absence of credit rating is a matter of choice 
rather than credit rationing. So, classifying them as constrained would not be accurate.  We report results for the case where 
we classify firms with zero debt and no credit rating as financially unconstrained.  Yet our results are robust to interpreting 
them as financially constrained or excluding them from our sample. 
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predictions.  In the specifications which include the 3-month and RNMs, the coefficients of the two 
out four interaction variables (volatility and kurtosis, book and market leverage) is negative and 
statistically significant. In the specifications which include the 12-month RNMs, all four interaction 
dummy coefficients are negative and statistical significant. 
Finally, in line with Campello and Chen (2010) and Hovakimian (2011), the third criterion we adopt 
to classify firms is the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index as this was first applied by Lamont et al. 
(2001), i.e. 
𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = −1.002 × �𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ � + 0.283 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 3.139 × �𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ � 
                              −39.368 × �𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ � − 1.315 × �𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ �                            (14) 
where ,i tKZ  denotes the value of the Kaplan and Zingales index, ,i tCF denotes net cash flows, ,i tFA  
denotes fixed assets, ,i tMB denotes the market-to-book ratio, ,i tTC  denotes the sum of debt and equity 
book values, ,i tDIV  denotes dividends and ,i tCASH denotes cash holdings for the ith firm in quarter t.  
 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) obtain the left hand side of equation (14) using hand-collected 
qualitative information from the annual reports that firms file with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to classify firms in discrete categories according to the severity of the financial 
constraints they face.  Then, they construct an ordinal variable (1 for unconstrained, 2 for likely 
unconstrained, 3 for unclassified, 4 for likely constrained and 5 for undoubtedly constrained) based on 
this classification.  Next, they regress this ordinal variable on certain accounting variables to test 
whether the degree of financial constraints that a firm faces is related to these variables.  Lamont et al. 
(2001) use the estimated coefficients from this regression to construct the KZi,t index which measures 
the severity of financial constraints as a function of the accounting variables that Kaplan and Zingales 
used.  The greater the value of the index, the more constrained a firm is considered to be because higher 
values of the ordinal variable used by Kaplan and Zingales indicate more severe constraints.  
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 For any given RNM time horizon, we trace the median KZ index value across all firms-quarters 
in our panel. Within any given quarter, we classify a firm as constrained (unconstrained) if the KZ 
index value is greater (less) than the median index value.  
 Columns (5) and (6) in Table 8 report results for the effect of risk-neutral volatility and kurtosis 
(coefficient vector β ) and their interaction terms (coefficient vector ζ ) for the specifications that 
include the 6-month RNMs.  The coefficients for the RNMs are negative for the financially 
unconstrained group.  Moreover, the coefficients for the interaction dummy variables for risk-neutral 
volatility and kurtosis are negative and significant across both specifications.  These results corroborate 
the findings obtained in the case where the firm size or the existence of a credit rating was used as a 
criterion to classify firms as constrained and unconstrained. In the specifications which include the 3-
month and RNMs, the coefficients of the three out four interaction variables (volatility and kurtosis, 
book and market leverage) is negative and statistically significant. In the specifications which include 
the 12-month RNMs, all four interaction dummy coefficients are negative and statistical significant. 
 
6. Conclusions  
We test one of the main implications of the financial flexibility theory, that is whether the expectations 
of a firm's manager about future shocks on the firm's investment opportunity set are inversely related 
to firm’s leverage.  We proxy the expectations for future  shocks by the risk-neutral volatility and risk-
neutral kurtosis computed from equity options, respectively; the two risk-neutral moments (RNMs) 
are forward-looking and hence they constitute a natural choice to capture expectations about the 
variability of “normal” and large shocks, respectively .  We extract the two RNMs from a cross-section 
of liquid equity options over different time horizons.  We find that expectations for both small and 
large shocks matter and decrease the firm's leverage.  This effect is stronger for the small and the 
financially constrained firms as predicted by the theory.  Furthermore, expectations for future shocks 
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account for the determination of the firm's leverage even once we control for the traditional 
determinants of the firm's leverage.  In addition, we find that these expectations account for most of 
the leverage’s variability.  These results hold also for expectations spanning time horizons which 
extend beyond the quarter over which managers set the firm leverage. 
 Our results have four implications.  First, managers set the leverage to prevail over the current 
period at a lower level when they expect a future shock.  This is consistent with the empirical evidence 
that managers look for financial flexibility, i.e. they maintain low leverage today to preserve the ability 
to borrow when a future shock dictates a financing need.  It is also in accordance with the DeAngelo 
et al. (2011) model's predictions.  Second, managers set leverage by taking into account expectations 
for both small and large future shocks.  Third, expectations about future shocks constitute have a 
stronger impact on capital structure decisions compared to the effect of the standard leverage 
determinants proposed by the previous literature, with the exception of industry median leverage. 
Fourth, managers are concerned not only about shocks to be realized over the quarter that leverage is 
set but they are also concerned for shocks to be realized at times beyond that. In sum, the results of our 
study confirm one of the main implications of the financial flexibility paradigm and suggest that the 





Ai Hengjie and Dana Kiku. 2016. Volatility Risks and Growth Options. Management Science 62(3): 
741-763 
Altman, E. 1968. Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. 
The Journal of Finance XXIII:589–609. 
Andres, C., D. Cumming, D. Schweizer, and T. Karabiber. 2014. Do Markets Anticipate Capital 
Structure Decisions ? – Feedback Effects in Equity Liquidity. Journal of Corporate Finance 27:133–
56. 
Bakshi, G., Kapadia, N., and D. Madan, 2003. Stock Return Characteristics, Skew Laws, and the 
Differential Pricing of Individual Equity Options, Review of Financial Studies 16:101–143. 
Bali, T. G., Engle, R. F., and S. Murray, 2016. Empirical Asset Pricing: The Cross-Section of Stock 
Returns, Wiley Publishers. 
Bancel, F., and U. R. Mittoo. 2004. Cross-Country Determinants of Capital Structure Choice: A Survey 
of European Firms. Financial Management 33:103–32. 
Barone-Adesi, G., and R. E. Whaley, 1987. Efficient analytical approximation of American option 
values, Journal of Finance 42:301-320. 
Bates, D. S., 1991. The crash of 87: Was it Expected? The Evidence from Options Markets, Journal 
of Finance 46:1009–1044. 
Bertrand, M. & Schoar, A. (2003). Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1169–1208. 
38 
 
Black F. and Scholes M. 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities  Journal of Political 
Economy 81:637–654. 
Black, F., and M. Scholes. 1973. The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. Journal of Political 
Economy 81:637–54. 
Borochin, P., and J. Yang. 2017. Options, Equity Risks, and the Value of Capital Structure 
Adjustments, Journal of Corporate Finance 42:150–178  
Brounen, D., A. de Jong, and K. Koedijk. 2006. Capital Structure Policies in Europe: Survey Evidence. 
Journal of Banking & Finance 30:1409–42. 
Byoun, Soku, Financial Flexibility and Capital Structure Decision. 2011. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1108850 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1108850 
Byoun, Soku, The Effects of Financial Flexibility Demand on Corporate Financial Decisions. 2016. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817972 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2817972 
Calomiris, C. W., C. Himmelberg, and P. Wachtel. 1995. Commercial Paper, Corporate Finance, and 
the Business Cycle: A Microeconomic Perspective. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy 42:203–50. 
Cameron, A. C., J. B. Gelbach, and D. L. Miller. 2011. Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering. 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 29:238–49. 
Campbell, John Y., Jens Dietrich Hilscher, and Jan Szilagyi. 2011. Predicting financial distress and 
the performance of distressed stocks. Journal of Investment Management 9, 14-34. 
Campello, M., and L. Chen. 2010. Are Financial Constraints Priced? Evidence from Firm 
Fundamentals and Stock Returns. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 42:1185–98. 
39 
 
Chang, B-Y., Christoffersen, P., Jacobs, K., 2013, Market Skewness Risk and the Cross-Section of 
Stock Returns, Journal of Financial Economics 107:46-68. 
Chava, S., and Jarrow, R. A. 2004. Bankruptcy prediction with industry effects.  Review of Finance 8: 
537-569. 
Chen, C. R., and Steiner, T. L. 1999. Managerial ownership and agency conflicts: A nonlinear 
simultaneous equation analysis of managerial ownership, risk taking, debt policy, and dividend policy 
Financial Review 34:119-136. 
Christie, A. 1982, The stochastic behavior of common stock variances: Value, leverage and interest 
rate effects Journal of Financial Economics 10: 407–432. 
Christoffersen, P., Jacobs, K., Chang, B-Y., 2012. Forecasting with Option-Implied Information, 
forthcoming in the Handbook of Economic Forecasting, Volume 2, Elliott and Timmermann (Eds). 
Conrad, J., Dittmar, R.F., Ghysels, E., 2013. Ex Ante Skewness and Expected Stock Returns, Journal 
of Finance 68:85-124. 
Cox, J., S. A. Ross, and M. Rubinstein. 1979. Option Pricing: A Simplified Approach. Journal of 
Financial Economics 7:229–63. 
DeAngelo, H., A. S. Gonçalves, A. Salem, and R. M. Stulz. 2016. Corporate Deleveraging. Charles A. 
Dice Center Working Paper No. 2016-21. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2864506 
DeAngelo, H., and R. Roll. 2014. How Stable Are Corporate Capital Structures? Journal of Finance 
70: 373-418. 
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and T. M. Whited. 2011. Capital Structure Dynamics and Transitory 
Debt. Journal of Financial Economics 99:235–61. 
40 
 
Denis, D. J., ed. 2011. Financial Flexibility and Corporate Liquidity. Special issue, Journal of 
Corporate Finance 17:667–787. 
Denis, D. J., and S. B. McKeon. 2012. Debt Financing and Financial Flexibility Evidence from 
Proactive Leverage Increases. Review of Financial Studies 25:1897–1929. 
Dennis, P., and S. Mayhew. 2002. Risk-Neutral Skewness: Evidence from Stock Options. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37:471–93. 
Dumas, B., J. Fleming, and R. E. Whaley. 1998. Implied Volatility Functions: Empirical Tests. Journal 
of Finance 53:2059–2106. 
Elkamhi, R., R. S. Pungaliya, and A. M. Vijh. 2014. What Do Credit Markets Tell Us About the 
Tradeoff Theory and Speed of Adjustment? Management Science 60:2269-2290. 
Faccio, M., Marchica, M.-T., & Mura, R. 2016. CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and the efficiency 
of capital allocation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 39:193–209. 
Faccini R., Konstantinidi E., Skiadopoulos G., and S. Sarantopoulou-Chiourea 2018. A New Predictor 
of U.S. Real Economic Activity: The S&P 500 Option Implied Risk Aversion. Management Science, 
Forthcoming. 
Fahlenbrach, R., and R. M. Stulz. 2009. Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value. Journal of 
Financial Economics 92:342–61. 
Faulkender, M., and M. A. Petersen. 2006. Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital Structure? Review 
of Financial Studies 19:45–79. 
Faulkender, M., M. J. Flannery, K. W. Hankins, and J. M. Smith. 2012. Cash Flows and Leverage 
Adjustments. Journal of Financial Economics 103:632–46. 
41 
 
Ferrando, A., Marchica, M.-T. and R. Mura. 2017. Financial Flexibility and Investment Ability Across 
the Euro Area and the UK. European Financial Management 23: 87–126 
Flannery, M. J., and K. P. Rangan. 2006. Partial Adjustment toward Target Capital Structures. Journal 
of Financial Economics 79:469–506. 
Flannery, M. J., S. Nikolova, and Ö. Öztekin. 2012. Leverage Expectations and Bond Credit Spreads. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47:689–714. 
Frank, M. Z., and V. K. Goyal. 2008. Trade-of and Pecking Order Theories of Debt. In B.E. 
Eckbo(Ed.), Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance. North-Holland. 
Frank, M. Z., and V. K. Goyal. 2009. Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors Are Reliably 
Important? Financial Management 38:1–37. 
Friesen, G., Y. Zhang, and T. Zorn, 2012. Heterogeneous Beliefs and Risk-Neutral Skewness Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47: 851-872. 
Frydman, C., and R. E. Saks. 2010. Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term 
Perspective, 1936-2005. Review of Financial Studies 23:2099–2138. 
Gao, W., Ng, L., and Wang, Q. 2011. Does corporate headquarters location matter for firm capital 
structure? Financial Management 40: 113-138. 
Gertler, M., and S. Gilchrist. 1994. Monetary Policy, Business Cycles, and the Behavior of Small 
Manufacturing Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:309–40. 
Giamouridis, D. and Skiadopoulos, G. (2012). The Informational Content of Financial Options for 
Quantitative Asset Management: A Review. In Handbook of Quantitative Asset Management, 243-
265, B. Scherer and K. Winston (Editors), Oxford University Press. 
42 
 
Gorbenko, A. S., and I. A. Strebulaev. 2010. Temporary versus Permanent Shocks: Explaining 
Corporate Financial Policies. Review of Financial Studies 23:2591–2647. 
Graham, J. R. 2000. How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt? Journal of Finance 55, 1901–1941. 
Graham, J. R., and C. R. Harvey. 2001. The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: Evidence from 
the Field. Journal of Financial Economics 60:187–243. 
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., and Puri, M. 2013. Managerial attitudes and corporate actions Journal 
of Financial Economics 109: 103-121. 
Grennan, J. P., Michaely, R., and Vincent, C. J. (2017). The Deleveraging of US Firms and Institutional 
Investors' Role. Available at SSRN https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1941902  
Grullon, Gustavo, Lyandres Evgeny, and Alexei Zhdanov. 2002. Real Options, Volatility, and Stock 
Returns. Journal of Finance 67:1499–1537. 
Hahn, J., and H. Lee. 2009. Financial Constraints, Debt Capacity, and the Cross-Section of Stock 
Returns. Journal of Finance 64:891–921. 
Halling, M., Yu, J., and J. Zechner. 2016. Leverage Dynamics over the Business Cycle, Journal of 
Financial Economics: 21–41.  
Han, B., 2008. Investor Sentiment and Option Prices Review of Financial Studies 21: 387-414 
Hansis, A., Schlag, C. and G. Vilkov, 2010. The Dynamics of Risk-Neutral Implied Moments: 
Evidence from Individual Options. Working Paper, Goethe University. 
Hess, D. and P. Immenkötter, 2014. How Much Is Too Much? Debt Capacity and Financial Flexibility, 
University of Cologne CFR Working paper, No. 14-03. 
43 
 
Hiraki, K. and G. Skiadopoulos, 2019. The Contribution of Frictions to Expected Returns, Working 
Paper, Queen Mary, University of London. 
Holderness, C. G. 2009. The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States. Review of Financial 
Studies 22:1377–1408. 
Hovakimian, A., and G. Li. 2011. In Search of Conclusive Evidence: How to Test for Adjustment to 
Target Capital Structure. Journal of Corporate Finance 17:33–44. 
Hovakimian, G. 2011. Financial Constraints and Investment Efficiency: Internal Capital Allocation 
across the Business Cycle. Journal of Financial Intermediation 20:264–83. 
Huang, R., and J. R. Ritter. 2009. Testing Theories of Capital Structure and Estimating the Speed of 
Adjustment. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44:237–71. 
Jackwerth, J. C., 2004. Option-Implied Risk-Neutral Distributions and Risk Aversion, Research 
Foundation of AIMR, Charlotteville, USA. 
Jeng, L. A., A. Metrick, and R. Zeckhauser. 2003. Estimating the Returns to Insider Trading: A 
Performance-Evaluation Perspective. Review of Economics and Statistics 85:453–71. 
Jiang, G. J., and Y. S. Tian. 2005. The Model-Free Implied Volatility and Its Information Content. 
Review of Financial Studies 18:1305–42. 
Kahle, K. M., and Stulz, R. M. 2013. Access to capital, investment, and the financial crisis. Journal of 
Financial Economics 110: 280-299. 
Kaplan, S. N., and L. Zingales. 1997. Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures 
of Financing Constraints. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:169–215. 
44 
 
Korajczyk, R. A., and A. Levy. 2003. Capital Structure Choice: Macroeconomic Conditions and 
Financial Constraints. Journal of Financial Economics 68:75–109. 
Kostakis, A., Panigirtzoglou, N., and Skiadopoulos, G. 2011. Market Timing with Option-Implied 
Distributions: A Forward-Looking Approach. Management Science, 57:1231-1249. 
Lakonishok, J., and I. Lee. 2001. Are Insider Trades Informative? Review of Financial Studies 14:79–
111. 
Lamont, O., C. Polk, and Jesús Saá-Requejo. 2001. Financial Constraints and Stock Returns. Review 
of Financial Studies 14:529–54. 
Leary, M. T. 2009. Bank Loan Supply, Lender Choice, and Corporate Capital Structure. Journal of 
Finance 64:1143–85. 
Leary, M. T. and Roberts, M. R. 2005. Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures? Journal of 
Finance, 60: 2575–2619.  
Lemmon, M. L., M. R. Roberts, and J. F. Zender. 2008. Back to the Beginning: Persistence and the 
Cross-Section of Corporate Capital Structure. Journal of Finance 33:1575–1608. 
MacKie-Mason, J. K. 1990. Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions? Journal of Finance 
45:1471–93. 
Marchica, M. T., and R. Mura. 2010. Financial Flexibility, Investment Ability, and Firm Value: 
Evidence from Firms with Spare Debt Capacity. Financial Management 39:1339–65. 
Merton, R. C. 1973. Theory of Rational Theory Option Pricing. Bell Journal of Economics 4:141–83. 
45 
 
Moh'd, M. A., Perry, L. G., and Rimbey, J. N. 1998. The impact of ownership structure on corporate 
debt policy: A time-series cross-sectional analysis. Financial Review 33: 85-98. 
Neumann, M., and Skiadopoulos, G. 2013. Predictable Dynamics in Higher Order Risk-Neutral 
Moments: Evidence from the S&P 500 Options. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
48:947-977. 
Petersen, M. A. 2009. Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches. 
Review of Financial Studies 22:435–80. 
Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales. 1995. What do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from 
International Data. Journal of Finance 50:1421–60. 
Rehman, Z., and Vilkov, G., 2012. Risk-Neutral Skewness: Return Predictability and its Sources, 
Working paper, Goethe University. 
Sanderson, E., and Windmeijer, F., 2016. A weak instrument F-test in linear IV models with multiple 
endogenous variables. Journal of Econometrics 190:212–221. 
Saretto, A. and Tookes, H., 2013. Corporate Leverage, Debt Maturity and Credit Supply: The Role of 
Credit Default Swaps, Review of Financial Studies 26: 1190-1247. 
Schaefer, S. M., and Strebulaev, I. A. 2008. Structural models of credit risk are useful: Evidence from 
hedge ratios on corporate bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 90: 1-19. 
Shumway T. 2001. Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: A simple hazard model Journal of 
Business 74: 101–124. 
Taylor, S., Yadav, P., and Y. Zhang, 2009. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Risk-Neutral Skewness. 
Journal of Derivatives 16, 38–52. 
46 
 
Thompson, S. B. 2011. Simple Formulas for Standard Errors That Cluster by Both Firm and Time. 
Journal of Financial Economics 99:1–10. 
Welch, I. 2004. Capital Structure and Stock Returns. Journal of Political Economy 112:106–31. 

















Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
Panel A: Sample for 3-month RNMs 
ML 0.159 0.153 0.000 0.701  26,327  
BL 0.213 0.162 0.000 0.688  26,327  
INDUSTRY (ML) 0.150 0.102 0.000 0.916  26,327  
INDUSTRY (BL) 0.203 0.106 0.000 0.914  26,327  
MB 2.489 1.639 0.844 9.715  26,327  
ASSETS 8.424 1.483 5.134 12.053  26,327  
PROF 0.043 0.026 -0.028 0.126  26,327  
TANG 0.269 0.219 0.016 0.880  26,327  
SELL 0.239 0.164 0.013 0.779  26,327  
DEP 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.033  26,327  
VOL3 0.178 0.081 0.060 0.432  26,327  
KURT3 3.775 1.197 2.803 10.676  26,327  
      
Panel B: Sample for 6-month RNMs 
ML 0.168 0.158 0.000 0.701  28,521  
BL 0.219 0.163 0.000 0.688  28,521  
INDUSTRY (ML) 0.152 0.103 0.000 0.949  28,521  
INDUSTRY (BL) 0.204 0.106 0.000 0.914  28,521  
MB 2.397 1.556 0.844 9.715  28,521  
ASSETS 8.523 1.453 5.134 12.053  28,521  
PROF 0.042 0.025 -0.028 0.126  28,521  
TANG 0.273 0.219 0.016 0.880  28,521  
SELL 0.239 0.164 0.013 0.779  28,521  
DEP 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.033  28,521  
VOL6 0.238 0.104 0.085 0.582  28,521  




Table 1 (cont’d): Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel C: Sample for 12-month RNMs 
ML 0.180 0.163 0.000 0.701  18,023  
BL 0.231 0.163 0.000 0.688  18,023  
INDUSTRY (ML) 0.155 0.104 0.000 0.949  18,023  
INDUSTRY (BL) 0.206 0.104 0.000 0.914  18,023  
MB 2.332 1.501 0.844 9.715  18,023  
ASSETS 9.114 1.320 5.134 12.053  18,023  
PROF 0.041 0.025 -0.028 0.126  18,023  
TANG 0.287 0.223 0.016 0.880  18,023  
SELL 0.243 0.167 0.013 0.779  18,023  
DEP 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.033  18,023  
VOL12 0.319 0.126 0.116 0.720  18,023  
KURT12 3.440 0.973 1.780 7.605  18,023  
 
Entries report summary statistics for all variables used in equation (8)..  Three samples are formed based on the respective 
risk-neutral moments’ three horizons (3, 6 and 12-months) under scrutiny. The size of each sample is determined by the 
availability of RNMs and accounting data used to construct the variables for leverage measures and leverage determinants.. 
BL is book leverage, i.e. book debt divided by book assets. ML is market leverage, i.e. book debt divided by the sum of 
market equity and book debt. INDUSTRY is the median leverage of the industry (defined by two-digit SIC codes) that the 
firm belongs to. MB is the sum of book liabilities plus market value of equity divided by book assets. ASSETS is the 
natural log of book assets expressed in 2009 US dollars. DEP is depreciation and amortization divided by book assets. 
PROF is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by book assets. TANG is net property, plant 
and equipment divided by book assets. SELL is selling, general and administrative expenses divided by sales. VOL3 
(VOL6) (VOL12) is the daily average over a quarter of firm-specific stock return volatility extracted from 90-days (180-
days) (360-days) option prices. KURT3 (KURT6) (KURT12) is the daily average over a quarter of firm-specific stock 






















 Table 2. Summary statistics of leverage ratios across high and low 
risk-neutral volatility and kurtosis groups 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Sample for 3-month RNMs 











ML         
  Mean 0.220 0.099 0.00 0.160 0.158  0.27 
  Median 0.183 0.058 0.00 0.107 0.131 0.00 
  N 13,163 13,163  13,163 13,163  
BL         
  Mean 0.280 0.146  0.00 0.195 0.230  0.00 
  Median 0.266 0.122 0.00 0.182 0.221 0.00 
  N 13,163 13,163  13,163 13,163  
 














ML         
  Mean 0.231 0.104 0.00 0.173 0.163 0.00 
  Median 0.192 0.065 0.00 0.119 0.136 0.00 
  N 14,260 14,260  14,261 14,260  
BL       
  Mean 0.290 0.148 0.00 0.203 0.235 0.00 
  Median 0.274 0.127 0.00 0.190 0.224 0.00 
  N 14,260 14,260  14,260 14,260  
 














ML         
  Mean 0.243 0.117 0.00 0.200 0.160 0.00 
  Median 0.200 0.081 0.00 0.143 0.136 0.00 
  N 9,011 9,011  9,011 9,011  
BL       
  Mean 0.298 0.163 0.00 0.222 0.238 0.00 
  Median 0.277 0.150 0.00 0.208 0.225 0.00 
  N 9,011 9,011  9,011 9,011  
 
Entries report the summary statistics of leverage ratios across two groups of firms sorted on the magnitude of risk-neutral 
volatility and kurtosis, separately. For any given time horizon, we trace the median value for risk-neutral volatility 
(kurtosis) across all firm-quarters in the panel. Then, we sort firms with RNMs greater (smaller) than the median in the 
high (low) group. Columns (1) and (2) [(4) and (5)] present the average and median values for leverage across the two 
volatility (kurtosis) groups. BL is book leverage, i.e. book debt divided by book assets. ML is market leverage, i.e. book 
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debt divided by the sum of market equity and book debt. N is the number of firm-quarter observations. Risk-neutral 
volatility (kurtosis) for the 3-, 6- and 12-month horizon is the daily average over a quarter of firm-specific stock return 
volatility (kurtosis) extracted option prices with maturities 3-, 6- and 12-months. The test for mean (median) comparison 




Table 3. Effect of Risk-neutral moments to leverage 
 3-month RNMs 6-month RNMs 12-month RNMs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ML BL ML BL ML BL 
INDUSTRY 0.564*** 0.544*** 0.603*** 0.570*** 0.630*** 0.631*** 
 (16.32) (14.59) (18.28) (15.54) (17.67) (14.38) 
       
MB -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.004** 
 (-8.26) (-3.21) (-7.62) (-2.61) (-5.79) (-2.00) 
       
ASSETS 0.007* -0.003 0.012*** -0.001 0.008 -0.007 
 (1.70) (-0.56) (2.91) (-0.19) (1.56) (-1.14) 
       
PROF -0.935*** -0.730*** -0.924*** -0.672*** -0.877*** -0.492*** 
 (-11.31) (-7.32) (-11.40) (-6.79) (-9.53) (-4.63) 
       
TANG 0.073** 0.002 0.044 -0.027 -0.018 -0.101** 
 (2.23) (0.06) (1.32) (-0.71) (-0.47) (-2.46) 
       
SELL -0.107*** -0.090** -0.089*** -0.063 -0.084** -0.031 
 (-3.20) (-2.22) (-2.76) (-1.62) (-2.52) (-0.79) 
       
DEP 1.397*** 1.620** 1.600*** 1.535** 1.728*** 1.261* 
 (2.73) (2.53) (3.13) (2.37) (2.91) (1.71) 
       
VOL3 -0.290*** -0.347***     
 (-10.79) (-9.76)     
       
KURT3 -0.008*** -0.003**     
 (-7.74) (-2.01)     
       
VOL6   -0.298*** -0.301***   
   (-13.59) (-11.01)   
       
KURT6   -0.023*** -0.010***   
   (-11.14) (-4.63)   
       
VOL12     -0.335*** -0.269*** 
     (-12.62) (-10.23) 
       
VOL12     -0.032*** -0.014*** 
     (-9.50) (-4.84) 
N 26,327 26,327 28,521 28,521 18,023 18,023 
Adj. R2 0.335 0.200 0.363 0.204 0.436 0.234 
Adj. R2 without RNMs 0.301 0.166 0.305 0.162 0.343            0.184 
 
Entries report the results from estimating alternative specifications of equation (8). All equations are estimated via OLS 
with firm fixed effects. Sample period is 1996:Q1 to 2017:Q4. BL is book leverage, i.e. book debt divided by book assets. 
ML is market leverage, i.e. book debt divided by the sum of market equity and book debt. INDUSTRY is the median 
leverage of the industry (defined by two-digit SIC codes) that the firm belongs to. MB is the sum of book liabilities plus 
market value of equity divided by book assets. ASSETS is the natural log of book assets expressed in 2009 US dollars. 
DEP is depreciation and amortization divided by book assets. PROF is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization divided by book assets. TANG is net property, plant and equipment divided by book assets. SELL is selling, 
general and administrative expenses divided by sales. VOL3 (VOL6) (VOL12) / KURT3 (KURT6) (KURT12) is the daily 
average over a quarter of firm-specific stock return volatility/kurtosis extracted from options with maturities 90-, 180-, and 
360-days.  N is the number of firm-quarters. Adj. R2 is the within adj. R2. Adj. R2 without RNMs is the within Adj, R2 we 
get from estimating the specifications of equation (8) after excluding the RNMs. The reported t-statistics reflect standard 
errors (White standard errors clustered by firm) robust to heteroscedasticity and to residual dependence within firms.  




Table 4. Leverage determinants versus Risk-neutral moments: 6-month horizon 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ML BL ML BL 
INDUSTRY 51.2% 58.3% 6.2% 6.0% 
     
MB 5.3% 1.5% -1.7% -0.8% 
     
ASSETS 1.2% 0.0% 1.7% -0.1% 
     
PROF 9.6% 7.4% -2.3% -1.7% 
     
TANG 0.2% 0.1% 1.0% -0.6% 
     
SELL 0.8% 0.6% -1.5% -1.0% 
     
DEP 0.9% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 
     
VOL6 19.0% 27.8% -3.1% -3.1% 
     
KURT6 11.7% 3.0% -2.0% -0.9% 
N 28,521 28,521 28,521 28,521 
Adj. R2 0.363 0.204 0.363 0.204 
 
Entries in Panel A express the percentage of the within-firm adjusted R2 that is attributable to each explanatory variable in 
the regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. In each column, the entry for a particular variable is calculated 
as the ratio of the partial Type III explained sum of squares (henceforth ESS) of that variable over the sum of the partial 
Type III ESS of all explanatory variables in the model. Thus, every column adds to 100%. The partial Type III ESS are 
calculated as follows. For each explanatory variable, we estimate equation (9) after excluding the particular variable and 
calculate the explained sum of squares (henceforth ESS). The difference between the ESS of this model and the ESS of the 
model that includes the particular variable is the partial Type III ESS for the particular variable. Entries in Panel B express 
the change in leverage ratio caused by one standard deviation increase in each of the explanatory variables in equation (8), 
according to the coefficients reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. BL is book leverage, i.e. book debt divided by 
book assets. ML is market leverage, i.e. book debt divided by the sum of market equity and book debt. INDUSTRY is the 
median leverage of the industry (defined by two-digit SIC codes) that the firm belongs to. MB is the sum of book liabilities 
plus market value of equity divided by book assets. ASSETS is the natural log of book assets expressed in 2009 US dollars. 
DEP is depreciation and amortization divided by book assets. PROF is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization divided by book assets. TANG is net property, plant and equipment divided by book assets. SELL is selling, 
general and administrative expenses divided by sales. VOL6 (KURT6) is the daily average over a quarter of firm-specific 




Table 5. Leverage determinants versus Risk-neutral moments: IV regressions 
 ML BL 
   
INDUSTRY 1.185*** 1.032*** 
 (3.7) (4.77) 
MB 0.088** 0.035* 
 (2.12) (1.96) 
ASSETS 0.200*** 0.080** 
 (2.66) (2.27) 
PROF -0.123 -0.319 
 (-0.23) (-1.21) 
TANG -0.610* -0.308** 
 (-1.79) (-2.13) 
SELL 0.291 0.063 
 (1.22) (0.58) 
DEP 3.565 2.632** 
 (1.27) (1.98) 
VOL6 -4.498** -1.969** 
 (-2.42) (-2.43) 
KURT6 -0.690*** -0.294** 
 (-2.59) (-2.37) 
   
Instruments ANALYST_DISP ANALYST_DISP 
 TV_STOCKS TV_STOCKS 
   
SW Chi-square statistic (VOL6) 4.463 4.873 
p-value 0.035 0.027 
SW F-statistic (VOL6) 4.455 4.864 
p-value  0.035 0.028 
SW Chi-square statistic (KURT6) 4.538 4.980 
p-value 0.033 0.026 
SW F-statistic (KURT6) 4.531 4.971 
p-value 0.034 0.026 
N 23,367 23,367 
 
Entries report the results from estimating alternative specifications of equation (8) via two-stage least squares. The 
endogenous variables are VOL6 (KURT6) is the daily average over a quarter of firm-specific stock return volatility 
(kurtosis) extracted from 180-days option prices. The excluded instruments are ANALYST_DISP and TV_STOCKS. 
ANALYST_DISP is the monthly average over the quarter of the standard deviation of analysts’ EPS forecasts for the next 
annual earnings announcement divided by absolute value of the mean estimate. TV_STOCKS is the log of the daily average 
over a quarter of the number of traded firm-specific stocks. Entries also report chi-squared and F-statistics for the 
Sanderson-Windmeijer (2016) under identification and weak identification tests, respectively, of individual endogenous 
regressors. A rejection of the null for the under specification test indicates that the particular endogenous regressor in 
question is identified, i.e. that instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor. A rejection of the null for the weak 
specification test indicates that instruments are sufficiently correlated with the particular endogenous regressor in question. 
Sample period is 1996:Q1 to 2017:Q4. BL is book leverage, i.e. book debt divided by book assets. ML is market leverage, 
i.e. book debt divided by the sum of market equity and book debt. INDUSTRY is the median leverage of the industry 
(defined by two-digit SIC codes) that the firm belongs to. MB is the sum of book liabilities plus market value of equity 
divided by book assets. ASSETS is the natural log of book assets expressed in 2009 US dollars. DEP is depreciation and 
amortization divided by book assets. PROF is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by 
book assets. TANG is net property, plant and equipment divided by book assets. SELL is selling, general and administrative 
expenses divided by sales. N is the number of firm-quarters. The reported t-statistics reflect standard errors (White standard 
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errors clustered by firm) robust to heteroscedasticity and to residual dependence within firms. Numbers in parentheses are 




Table 6. Leverage determinants and Risk-neutral moments: Robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML 
Panel A: Specifications of equation (8) including market leverage  
INDUSTRY 0.606*** 0.603*** 0.605*** 0.604*** 0.549*** 0.560*** 0.446*** 0.441*** 
 (18.51) (18.33) (18.45) (18.52) (11.72) (16.79) (9.78) (9.77) 
         
MB -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.027*** -0.010*** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
 (-7.75) (-7.89) (-7.82) (-7.47) (-6.96) (-6.32) (-6.01) (-6.05) 
         
ASSETS 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.040*** 0.010** 0.039*** 0.038*** 
 (3.16) (2.99) (3.18) (3.40) (4.08) (2.28) (3.82) (3.76) 
         
PROF -0.851*** -0.852*** -0.852*** -0.811*** -0.617*** -0.870*** -0.642*** -0.650*** 
 (-13.36) (-13.30) (-13.29) (-12.83) (-7.65) (-13.48) (-7.99) (-8.11) 
         
TANG 0.041 0.035 0.041 0.028 0.077 0.046 0.039 0.059 
 (1.23) (1.04) (1.24) (0.83) (1.29) (1.39) (0.70) (1.00) 
         
RD -0.176*** -0.168*** -0.166*** -0.178*** -0.151*** -0.195*** -0.176*** -0.178*** 
 (-4.60) (-4.45) (-4.39) (-4.52) (-3.26) (-5.02) (-3.67) (-3.70) 
         
RD_D -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
 (-0.73) (-0.63) (-0.59) (-1.03) (-0.31) (-0.91) (-0.95) (-1.11) 
         
DEP 1.552*** 1.502*** 1.523*** 1.733*** 0.441 1.650*** 0.788 0.681 
 (3.13) (3.02) (3.07) (3.44) (0.64) (3.36) (1.19) (1.02) 
         
VOL6 -0.299*** -0.295*** -0.300*** -0.296*** -0.243*** -0.379*** -0.484*** -0.490*** 
 (-13.71) (-13.48) (-13.66) (-13.32) (-7.68) (-15.32) (-11.82) (-11.91) 
         
KURT6 -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.021*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (-11.40) (-11.21) (-11.33) (-10.94) (-8.39) (-10.79) (-7.56) (-7.61) 
         
AGE_CEO    -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 
    (-1.42)   (-0.63) (-0.78) 
         
GENDER_CEO    -0.029**   0.010 0.010 
    (-2.06)   (0.56) (0.56) 
         
INST_OWN     -0.118***  -0.115*** -0.113*** 
     (-3.50)  (-3.33) (-3.31) 
         
MAN_OWN     0.001  0.000 0.000 
     (0.55)  (0.25) (0.31) 
         
CRSP      -0.057*** -0.107*** -0.108*** 
      (-10.27) (-12.38) (-12.56) 
         
PROFITS      -0.004 0.039*** 0.039*** 
      (-1.22) (5.84) (5.76) 
         
GDP      -0.115 -0.598*** -0.588*** 
      (-1.46) (-6.58) (-6.37) 
PHYS_LOC FE NO YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
         
JUR_LOC FE NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
N 28521 28134 28331 26887 12338 28521 12205 12286 




Table 6. Leverage determinants and risk-neutral moments: Robustness checks (cont’d) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
Panel B: Specifications of equation (8) including market leverage  
INDUSTRY 0.572*** 0.574*** 0.572*** 0.567*** 0.506*** 0.537*** 0.449*** 0.450*** 
 (15.55) (15.51) (15.54) (15.09) (10.35) (14.45) (9.08) (9.10) 
         
MB -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.009** -0.005** -0.006* -0.006* 
 (-2.71) (-2.76) (-2.72) (-2.79) (-2.57) (-2.32) (-1.67) (-1.77) 
         
ASSETS -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.036*** -0.003 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 (-0.06) (-0.17) (-0.15) (-0.11) (3.10) (-0.57) (2.78) (2.74) 
         
PROF -0.606*** -0.604*** -0.611*** -0.596*** -0.489*** -0.604*** -0.491*** -0.501*** 
 (-7.63) (-7.57) (-7.62) (-7.68) (-6.35) (-7.60) (-6.42) (-6.60) 
         
TANG -0.028 -0.027 -0.029 -0.042 -0.046 -0.029 -0.076 -0.066 
 (-0.75) (-0.69) (-0.75) (-1.06) (-0.73) (-0.77) (-1.23) (-1.08) 
         
RD -0.092* -0.085 -0.081 -0.094* -0.082 -0.103** -0.096* -0.095* 
 (-1.77) (-1.64) (-1.57) (-1.78) (-1.64) (-2.00) (-1.93) (-1.92) 
         
RD_D 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.89) (0.97) (1.01) (0.34) (0.03) (0.71) (-0.54) (-0.64) 
         
DEP 1.489** 1.391** 1.391** 1.647** 0.622 1.423** 0.786 0.743 
 (2.32) (2.17) (2.19) (2.56) (0.82) (2.25) (1.05) (0.99) 
         
VOL6 -0.301*** -0.300*** -0.302*** -0.303*** -0.252*** -0.365*** -0.420*** -0.423*** 
 (-11.04) (-10.89) (-11.05) (-11.53) (-8.31) (-11.48) (-10.40) (-10.52) 
         
KURT6 -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (-4.71) (-4.59) (-4.67) (-4.71) (-3.31) (-3.93) (-2.21) (-2.25) 
         
AGE_CEO    0.000   0.000 0.000 
    (0.69)   (0.38) (0.34) 
         
GENDER_CEO    -0.004   0.029 0.029 
    (-0.31)   (1.33) (1.32) 
         
INST_OWN     -0.034  -0.040 -0.039 
     (-1.20)  (-1.36) (-1.32) 
         
MAN_OWN     0.001  0.000 0.000 
     (1.06)  (0.53) (0.54) 
         
CRSP      -0.049*** -0.071*** -0.072*** 
      (-8.57) (-8.82) (-8.91) 
         
PROFITS      -0.020*** 0.012* 0.012* 
      (-5.31) (1.93) (1.92) 
         
GDP      0.155* -0.264*** -0.258*** 
      (1.70) (-3.18) (-3.12) 
PHYS_LOC FE NO YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
         
JUR_LOC FE NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
N 28521 28134 28331 26887 12338 28521 12205 12286 




Entries report the results from estimating alternative specifications of equation (8). All equations are estimated via OLS 
with firm fixed effects. Sample period is 1996:Q1 to 2017:Q4. BL is book leverage, i.e. book debt divided by book 
assets. ML is market leverage, i.e. book debt divided by the sum of market equity and book debt. INDUSTRY is the 
median leverage of the industry (defined by two-digit SIC codes) that the firm belongs to. MB is the sum of book 
liabilities plus market value of equity divided by book assets. ASSETS is the natural log of book assets expressed in 2009 
US dollars. DEP is depreciation and amortization divided by book assets. PROF is earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization divided by book assets. TANG is net property, plant and equipment divided by book 
assets. SELL is selling, general and administrative expenses divided by sales.  VOL6 (KURT6) is the daily average over 
a quarter of firm-specific stock return volatility (kurtosis) extracted from 180-days option prices. AGE_CEO is the age of 
the CEO. GENDER_CEO is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is male and zero if the CEO is 
female. INST_OWN is the ratio of the number of shares held by institutional investors to the total number of shares 
outstanding. MAN_OWN is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the firm's executives (top managers and 
directors), including options that are exercisable or will become exercisable within 60 days. CRSP is the one-year real 
stock market return. PROFITS is the one-year real aggregate domestic nonfinancial corporate profit growth. GDP is and 
the one-year real GDP growth. PHYS_LOC_FE are fixed effects for corporate headquarters location. JUR_LOC_FE are 
fixed effects for the geographic region, where companies are legally registered. N is the number of firm-quarters. Adj. R2 
is the within adj. R2. The reported t-statistics reflect standard errors (White standard errors clustered by firm) robust to 
heteroscedasticity and to residual dependence within firms. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * indicate 




Table 7: Leverage determinants and risk-neutral moments: Liquidity deciles 
Panel A: Specifications with market leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML 
VOL6 -0.221*** -0.218*** -0.248*** -0.250*** -0.311*** -0.217*** -0.300*** -0.275*** -0.257*** -0.298*** 
 (-5.31) (-5.74) (-5.53) (-5.52) (-7.06) (-5.54) (-6.67) (-5.61) (-4.85) (-5.95) 
           
KURT6 -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.042*** -0.035*** -0.016*** -0.020*** 
 (-5.03) (-5.77) (-5.18) (-4.27) (-6.12) (-6.67) (-6.95) (-5.32) (-3.09) (-4.84) 
N 2761 2728 2722 2744 2762 2758 2781 2797 2788 2821 
r2 0.261 0.308 0.322 0.361 0.400 0.389 0.386 0.442 0.497 0.454 
 
Panel B: Specifications with book leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML 
VOL6 -0.304*** -0.255*** -0.229*** -0.236*** -0.291*** -0.210*** -0.281*** -0.213*** -0.237*** -0.270*** 
 (-5.66) (-5.49) (-3.60) (-3.83) (-5.50) (-4.06) (-5.07) (-3.29) (-4.43) (-4.94) 
           
KURT6 -0.006*** -0.009** -0.006 -0.005 -0.007* -0.010** -0.018*** -0.013*** 0.001 -0.012** 
 (-2.89) (-2.43) (-1.35) (-1.03) (-1.75) (-2.03) (-3.88) (-2.81) (0.17) (-2.49) 
N 2761 2728 2722 2744 2762 2758 2781 2797 2788 2821 
Adj. R2 0.162 0.201 0.188 0.171 0.211 0.168 0.220 0.224 0.352 0.308 
 
Entries report the results from estimating alternative specifications of equation (8) including 6-month RNMs across liquidity deciles. . For brevity, we report results only for 
risk-neutral volatility and kurtosis. We use the options’ trading volume to measure option liquidity.  For any given firm, we calculate the options’ trading volume as the daily 
average over a quarter of the number of traded option contracts.  Next, we sort options in liquidity deciles and estimate equation (8) for each decile. All equations are estimated 
by OLS with firm fixed effects. Sample period is 1996:Q1 to 2017:Q4. VOL6 (KURT6) is the daily average over a quarter of firm-specific stock return volatility (kurtosis) 
extracted from180-days option prices.  N is the number of firm-quarters. Adj. R2 is the within adj. R2. The reported t-statistics reflect standard errors (White standard errors 
clustered by firm) robust to heteroscedasticity and to residual dependence within firms.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 






Table 8. Leverage determinants and risk-neutral moments: Probability of Default 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ML BL ML BL ML BL ML BL 
INDUSTRY 0.394*** 0.500*** 0.473*** 0.526*** 0.606*** 0.518*** 0.602*** 0.580*** 
 (15.45) (13.89) (16.76) (14.38) (18.91) (13.56) (18.14) (16.02) 
         
MB -0.004*** 0 -0.006*** -0.002 -0.014*** -0.004** -0.012*** -0.005** 
 (-3.73) (-0.18) (-5.10) (-1.00) (-7.79) (-2.11) (-7.57) (-2.56) 
         
ASSETS 0.003 -0.005 0.010** -0.001 0.012** -0.003 0.013*** 0 
 (0.84) (-1.09) (2.56) (-0.28) -2.58 (-0.48) -2.91 (0.02) 
         
PROF -0.443*** -0.422*** -0.647*** -0.543*** -0.466*** 0.061 -0.923*** -0.658*** 
 (-6.88) (-4.45) (-9.15) (-5.63) (-5.14) -0.51 (-10.97) (-6.58) 
         
TANG -0.026 -0.077** -0.014 -0.066* 0.064* -0.014 0.047 -0.026 
 (-0.99) (-2.13) (-0.49) (-1.77) -1.96 (-0.37) (1.36) (-0.70) 
         
SELL -0.077*** -0.055 -0.086*** -0.062 -0.090** -0.06 -0.092*** -0.063 
 (-2.95) (-1.47) (-2.98) (-1.61) (-2.46) (-1.41) (-2.73) (-1.56) 
         
DEP 0.228 0.859 0.689 1.119* 1.244** 0.949 1.558*** 1.524** 
 (0.55) (1.37) (1.5) (1.74) -2.23 -1.34 (2.92) (2.27) 
         
VOL6 -0.367*** -0.337*** -0.357*** -0.326*** -0.293*** -0.279*** -0.306*** -0.305*** 
 (-19.82) (-12.82) (-17.57) (-12.26) (-13.15) (-10.73) (-13.83) (-11.51) 
         
KURT6 -0.012*** -0.004** -0.016*** -0.006*** -0.020*** -0.005** -0.022*** -0.010*** 
 (-8.84) (-2.26) (-9.85) (-3.29) (-10.04) (-2.51) (-10.87) (-4.66) 
         
CHS_M 0.051*** 0.025***       
 (35.12) (16.39)       
   0.045*** 0.021***     
CHS_Y   (28.39) (12.83)     
         
         
ALT     -0.066*** -0.097***   
     (-11.86) (-11.31)   
         
CFLOW       0.371* 0.381* 
       (1.89) (1.9) 
         
N 28,035 28,035 28,035 28,035 24,435 24,435 27,361 27,361 
Adj, R2 0.538 0.243 0.462 0.222 0.43 0.29 0.369 0.209 
         
Entries report the results from estimating alternative specifications of equation (8). All equations are estimated via OLS 
with firm fixed effects. Sample period is 1996:Q1 to 2017:Q4. BL is book leverage, i.e. book debt divided by book assets. 
ML is market leverage, i.e. book debt divided by the sum of market equity and book debt. INDUSTRY is the median 
leverage of the industry (defined by two-digit SIC codes) that the firm belongs to. MB is the sum of book liabilities plus 
market value of equity divided by book assets. ASSETS is the natural log of book assets expressed in 2009 US dollars. 
DEP is depreciation and amortization divided by book assets. PROF is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization divided by book assets. TANG is net property, plant and equipment divided by book assets. RD is R&D 
expenses divided by sales after setting missing values to zero. RD_D is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
firm does not report R&D expenses and zero otherwise. VOL6 (KURT6) is the daily average over a quarter of firm-specific 
stock return volatility (kurtosis) extracted from 180-days option prices. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = −8.63 − 29 × 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁����������𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 3.51 ×
𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 − 2.49 × 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 8.02 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁����������𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 1.69 × 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 0.138 × 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 0.05 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 0.974 ×
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = −8.87 − 20.12 × 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁����������𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 1.60 × 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 − 2.27 × 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 7.88 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁����������𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
1.55 × 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 0.005 × 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 0.07 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 0.09 × 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 where (NIMTA) ̅_(i,t) denotes the average ratio of 
net income to market value of assets over the last four quarters, i.e. the period spanning quarter t-3 to quarter t, TLMTAi,t 
denotes the ratio of total liabilities to market value of assets, CASHMTAi,t denotes the ratio of cash and short-term 
investments to market value of assets,  (EXRET) ̅_(i,t) denotes the stock’s average excess return relative to the S&P 500 
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index return over the last 12 months, i.e. . the period spanning month t-11 to month t, SIGMAi,t denotes the annualized 
stock return standard deviation over the previous 3 months, RSIZEi,t denotes the firm’s equity capitalization relative to 
that of the S&P 500 index, MBi,t denotes the equity market-to-book ratio, and PRICEi,t denotes the log of the stock price. 
The market value of assets is the sum of the firm’s total liabilities and market value of equity. ALT is Altman’s Z-score. 
CFLOW is the standard deviation of the first difference in the firm's historical operating profits (EBITDAi,t – EBITDAi,t-
1) divided by the mean of total assets to measure cash flow volatility.  N is the number of firm-quarters. Adj. R2 is the 
within adj. R2. The reported t-statistics reflect standard errors (White standard errors clustered by firm) robust to 
heteroscedasticity and to residual dependence within firms. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * indicate 


















Table 9. The effect of risk-neutral moments on leverage across financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms separately 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ML BL ML BL ML BL 
VOL6 -0.201*** -0.224***     
 (-7.41) (-6.87)     
       
KURT6 -0.014*** -0.002     
 (-6.08) (-0.63)     
       
VOL6*D_SMALL -0.139*** -0.095**     
 (-3.67) (-2.04)     
       
KURT6* D_SMALL -0.017*** -0.017***     
 (-4.46) (-4.68)     
       
VOL6   -0.132*** -0.213***   
   (-6.40) (-5.47)   
       
KURT6   -0.009*** -0.004*   
   (-6.06) (-1.70)   
       
VOL6*D_CONSTR   -0.332*** -0.158***   
   (-8.98) (-3.37)   
       
KURT6* D_CONSTR   -0.025*** -0.010***   
   (-7.07) (-3.12)   
       
VOL6     -0.095*** -0.050* 
     (-3.43) (-1.94) 
       
KURT6     -0.157*** -0.131*** 
     (-3.82) (-3.25) 
       
VOL6*D_KZ     -0.006** -0.002 
     (-2.01) (-0.64) 
       
KURT6* D_KZ     -0.035*** -0.012* 
     (-5.68) (-1.81) 
N 28,521 28,521 28,408 28,408 27,609 27,609 
Firms 0.363 0.203 0.406 0.209 0.376 0.197 
 
 
Entries report results from estimating three alternative versions of equation (13): 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝜏𝜏 +
𝜁𝜁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝜏𝜏 + 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   In each of our three subsamples, i.e. the subsamples corresponding to 3- 6- and 
12-month RNMs, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable that, within any given quarter, takes the value of one if the firm is identified as 
financially constrained and 0 unconstrained. Coefficient vectors α, β and γ represent the effect of firm fixed effects, risk-
neutral moments ,( )i tRNM  and firm-level ,( )i tFL  factors, respectively, on leverage for the unconstrained group of firms. 
That is, if we estimated equation (8) using only the firm-quarters that belong to the unconstrained group, we would have 
obtained these estimates. Vectors φ, ζ and η represent the differences between the coefficients for the unconstrained-firm 
and the constrained-firm group. That is, if we estimated equation (8) using only the firm-quarters that belong to the 
constrained group, we would have obtained coefficients α+φ, β+ζ and γ+η for fixed effects, risk-neutral moments and 
firm-level factors, respectively. For brevity, we report results only for risk-neutral volatility and kurtosis (coefficient vector 
β) and their interaction terms (coefficient vector ζ). Entries in columns (1) and (2) report results from estimating a 
specification of equation (13) including ,
small
i tD , which is a dummy variable that, within any given quarter, takes the value 
of one if the value of the firm's real market value of assets (calculated as the book value of liabilities plus the market value 
of equity) is lower than the subsample median and zero otherwise. Entries in columns (3) and (4)  report results from 
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estimating a specification of equation (13) including, ,
constr
i tD , which is a dummy variable that takes the value of zero if a 
firm has a commercial paper rating or has not a commercial paper rating but has zero debt, and one otherwise. Entries in 
columns (5) and (6)  report results from estimating a specification of equation (13) including, ,
KZ
i tD  , which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the value of the KZ index is greater than the subsample median KZ index, and zero 
otherwise. The KZ index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Lammont et al. 2001) proxies for the level of financial constraints 
faced by a firm and is calculated as KZ = -1.002*(cash_flow/fixed_assets) + 0.283*market_to_book + 3.139*(debt/total 
capital) - 39.368*(dividends/fixed_assets) - 1.315*(cash/fixed_assets). Sample period is 1996:Q1 to 2017:Q4. BL is book 
leverage, i.e. book debt divided by book assets. ML is market leverage, i.e. book debt divided by the sum of market equity 
and book debt. VOL6 (KURT6) is the daily average over a quarter of firm-specific stock return volatility (kurtosis) 
extracted from 180-days option prices. The reported t-statistics reflect standard errors (White standard errors clustered by 
firm) robust to heteroscedasticity and to residual dependence within firms. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** 
and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
